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Benefit corporations—corporations organized for the express
purpose of realizing both financial wealth for shareholders and articulated
social or environmental benefits1—have taken the United States by storm.
With Maryland passing the first benefit corporation statute in 2010,2
legislative growth of the form has been rapid. Currently, thirty states and
the District of Columbia have passed benefit corporation statutes, and
seven additional states have legislation pending.3
The proliferation of benefit corporation statutes and B Corp
certifications (a seal of approval, of sorts)4 can largely be attributed to the
active promotional work of B Lab Company (B Lab), a nonprofit
corporation organized in 2006 under Pennsylvania law that supports social
enterprise and business mission alignment writ large.5 B Lab works with
individuals and interest groups to generate attention to social enterprise
and mission alignment in two key ways. First, it focuses its operations on
creating a movement around firms that “meet the highest standards of
1. See, e.g., J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications, and
Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2012) (summarizing the benefit
corporation form); Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of
Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 593–606 (2011) (describing the benefit corporation
form in detail). Under most state statutes, a benefit corporation must articulate both social and
environmental benefits.
2. See B Lab, Maryland First State in Union to Pass Benefit Corporation Legislation, CSRWIRE
(Apr. 14, 2010, 10:57 AM), http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/29332-Maryland-First-State-inUnion-to-Pass-Benefit-Corporation-Legislation [http://perma.cc/3V8X-3MCD]; Debra Cassens
Weiss, Md. Adopts Nation’s First Law Creating Do-Gooder ‘Benefit Corporations’, A.B.A. J. (Apr.
15, 2010, 4:06 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/md._adopts_nations_first_law_
creating_do-gooder_benefit_corporations/ [http://perma.cc/68KD-TFZ7].
3. See B Lab, State by State Status of Legislation, http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-bystate-status [http://perma.cc/669E-P6BX].
4. See What are B Corps?, BCORPORATION, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps
[http://perma.cc/AUN6-YHD3] (“B Corp is to business what Fair Trade certification is to coffee or
USDA Organic certification is to milk.”).
5. See J. Haskell Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, 75 MD. L. REV. 541, 575–78
(2016). See generally About B Lab, BCORPORATION, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-bcorps/about-b-lab (offering information about, among other things, B Lab’s history, funding,
governance, and operations). A quick search of the Pennsylvania Department of State’s online
database, https://www.corporations.pa.gov/search/corpsearch, confirms the corporate status of B Lab.
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verified, overall social and environmental performance, public
transparency, and legal accountability” and “align the interests of business
with those of society and to help high impact businesses be built to last.”6
Second, B Lab engenders awareness of and support for the benefit
corporation form and B Corp certification. B Lab also supplies model
benefit corporation legislation, social enterprise standards that may meet
the requirements of benefit corporation statutes in various states, and other
services to social enterprises.
Professor Haskell Murray reports that, as compared to other states,
Nevada and Delaware, leaders in the benefit corporation incorporation
race, have already registered relatively large numbers of benefit
corporation incorporations (Nevada with 1,130 and Delaware with 368).7
The larger number of benefit corporation incorporations in these two states
is somewhat predictable given the history of and efforts encouraging
incorporations in both states. Also, Delaware decisional law is arguably
particularly unfriendly to for-profit corporate boards that fail to place
shareholder financial wealth maximization first in every decision they
make.8
However, outside of Nevada and Delaware, benefit corporation
statutes have not, by and large, been the entity law version of a “field of
dreams” that some imagined or may have promised.9 Statutes have been
enacted, but social enterprise firms have not gravitated to them in large
numbers. In other words, despite the legislative popularity of the form,
there have not been as many benefit corporation incorporations as one
might expect. In the first four years of benefit corporation authority, for
example, Maryland reported fewer than forty benefit corporations.10
Tennessee’s benefit corporation statute came into effect in January 2016,
and as of May 2, 2016, Secretary of State filings evidence the organization
of twenty-six for-profit benefit corporations.11 Although this figure may
6. See About B Lab, supra note 5.
7. See Murray, supra note 5, at 588 (app. A). The number of Nevada benefit corporations may
over-count the number of actual benefit corporations, however. See infra note 15 and accompanying
text.
8. The Delaware Court of Chancery opinion in eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16
A.3d 1, 35 (Del. Ch. 2010), is widely cited as a reason and catalyst for benefit corporation statutes.
See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
9. The reference is to the popular 1989 Universal City Studios fantasy film, Field of Dreams,
starring Kevin Costner famous for the line, “If you build it, he will come.” See FIELD OF DREAMS
(Gordon Company 1989).
10. Benefit Corporations and Benefit LLCs formed in Maryland as of August 20, 2014,
MD. ST. DEP’T OF ASSESSMENTS & TAX’N, http://dat.maryland.gov/businesses/Documents/
Benefitcorpllc.pdf [https://perma.cc/VL38-KB6A].
11. Tennessee for-profit benefit corporation charter information included in this Article comes
from charters obtained in response to a public records request filed with the Business Services Division
of the Office of the Tennessee Secretary of State. These charters are on file with the author. Record
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seem impressive, a review of these Tennessee filings suggests that well
more than half were erroneously organized as benefit corporations.12
Colorado, another recent adopter of the benefit corporation, does appear
to have a large number of filings (ninety in total as of June 12, 2016, based
on the list of Colorado benefit corporations on the B Lab website).13
However, as with Tennessee, a number of these listed corporations appear
to be erroneously classified.14 Professor Murray, Professor Eric Franklin,
and others have raised similar concerns about the descriptive power of the
Nevada data on benefit corporation filings.15 These anecdotal offerings
indicate that published lists of benefit corporations—even those
constructed from state filing data—may over-count the number of
qualified benefit corporations, perhaps significantly.

keeping differences among states with authorized benefit corporations make accurate, comprehensive
data difficult to obtain. Although many states have online databases for corporations and other statechartered business entities, those databases may or may not be searchable in a manner that allows for
the easy or accurate identification of benefit corporations. Yet, public records requests, like the one
made in Tennessee, may enable researchers to secure the information they seek. Although B Lab
includes a list of “benefit corporations” on its website, the list includes LLCs and is preceded by an
explanation/disclaimer:
The list below is B Lab’s best effort to create an accurate accounting of benefit corps and
is inclusive of all data collated by B Lab from state agency reports. Many states do not
currently track the names or number of benefit corporations. B Lab continuously collects
this data, however each state has [sic] different level of reporting capabilities.
B Lab, Find a Benefit Corp., http://benefitcorp.net/businesses/find-a-benefit-corp.
12. Among other things, the filings include corporate purposes like: “SERVICE AUTO
GLASS,” “TRUCKING,” “Buy, sell, rent, and /or lease commercial and residential property,” “retail,”
and the like.
13. B Lab, Find a Benefit Corporation, http://benefitcorp.net/businesses/find-a-benefitcorp?field_bcorp_certified_value=&state=Colorado&title=&op=Go&sort_by=field_bcorp_state_val
ue&sort_order=ASC [http://perma.cc/5M9B-A2HY].
14. For example, the Colorado Secretary of State filing history of DDD Land Surveying Inc.
(listed as a benefit corporation on the B Lab website), History and Documents, COLO. SECRETARY OF
ST. http://www.sos.state.co.us/biz/BusinessEntityHistory.do?quitButtonDestination=BusinessEntity
Detail&pi1=1&nameTyp=ENT&entityId2=20121295013&srchTyp=ENTITY&masterFileId=20121
295013 [https://perma.cc/4PXL-SG5P], indicates that the corporation’s articles of incorporation were
amended to add public benefit corporation status and then later amended to remove it. The Colorado
Secretary of State filing history for another B Lab listed benefit corporation, Rizuto’s Cotton Candy,
Inc., lists its corporate purpose as “Food Service Cotton Candy,” calling into question its status as a
benefit corporation.
15. See Kate Cooney et al., Benefit Corporation and L3C Adoption: A Survey, STAN. SOC.
INNOVATION
REV.,
Dec.
5,
2014,
http://ssir.org/articles/entry/benefit_corporation_
and_l3c_adoption_a_survey; Eric Franklin, Nudging Entrepreneurs into Noncompliance: Why does
Nevada have so many Benefit Corporations?, UNLV L. BLOG (Sept. 23, 2016),
http://unlvlawblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/nudging-entrepreneurs-into.html [http://perma.cc/5EMQ6UUF]; Murray, supra note 5, at 581 (observing that Nevada’s reported number of benefit corporation
filings “may have been boosted by the inclusion of a benefit corporation check box on the state form,
which incorporators may or may not have fully understood”).
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Research for this Article identified no publicly held U.S. benefit
corporations.16 For these purposes (and as referenced throughout this
Article), the term “publicly held” in reference to a corporation is defined
to mean a corporation (a) with a class of equity securities registered under
§ 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (1934 Act);17 or
(b) otherwise required to file periodic reports with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) under § 13 of the 1934 Act.18 Yet, Laureate
Education, Inc., which converted to a Delaware benefit corporation in the
fall of 2015, has filed a Form S-1 for its initial public offering.19 Moreover,
benefit corporations may be subsidiaries of publicly held corporations (as
Ben & Jerry’s Homemade Inc., New Chapter Inc., and Plum, PBC have
demonstrated20), and corporations certified as B Corps have begun to enter
the ranks of publicly held corporations (perhaps Etsy, Inc. being the most

16. As this article was going to press, Laureate Education, Inc. announced the closing of its initial
public offering, making it the first publicly traded benefit corporation. See Press Release, Laureate
Education Announces Closing of its Initial Public Offering (Feb. 6, 2017), http://www.laureate.net/NewsRoom/PressReleases/2017/02/Laureate-Education-Announces-Closing-of-its-InitialPublic-Offering [https://perma.cc/6P73-QXHZ] [hereinafter Laureate Education Press Release]; see
also Haskell Murray, First Standalone Publicly Traded Benefit Corporation - Laureate Education,
BUS. L. PROF BLOG (Feb. 10, 2017), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2017/02/firststandalone-publicly-traded-benefit-corporation-laureate-education-.html
[https://perma.cc/LA8PE6B4]. Thus, the prediction made at the end of this paragraph has now become a reality. Due to
publication deadlines, this Article does not fully reflect the completion of the Laureate Education
offering.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78l (2012).
18. Id. § 78m.
19. See Alex Barinka, Laureate Education Plans IPO as a Public Benefit Company, BLOOMBERG
(Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-02/kkr-backed-laureate-educationfiles-for-initial-public-offering [http://perma.cc/RBM4-RVL6]; Brad Edmondson, The First Benefit
Corporation IPO Is Coming, And That’s A Big Deal, TRIPLEPUNDIT (Feb. 4, 2016),
http://www.triplepundit.com/2016/02/first-benefit-corporation-ipo-coming-thats-big-deal/#
[http://perma.cc/RX29-5XP6]; Chris Lange, Laureate Education Updates Finances in Most Recent
IPO Filing, 24/7 WALL ST. J. (May 23, 2016), http://247wallst.com/services/2016/05/23/laureateeducation-updates-finances-in-most-recent-ipo-filing/ [http://perma.cc/EQ9T-6UB7]. On the eve of
publication of this Article, Laureate Education’s initial public offering proceeded to closing.
Specifically, the registration statement was declared effective on January 31, 2017, and the offering
closed on February 6, 2017. See Laureate Education Press Release, supra note 16.
20. See Shelley Alpern, When B Corp Met Wall Street, CLEAN YIELD (Mar. 18, 2015),
http://www.cleanyield.com/when-b-corp-met-wall-street/ [http://perma.cc/BQ9M-TY22]; Aman
Singh, Campbell Becomes America’s First Public Company to Acquire a Public Benefit Corporation:
In Conversation with Plum Organics’ Cofounder, CSRWIRE (Sept. 9, 2013, 8:41 AM),
http://www.csrwire.com/blog/posts/1005-campbell-becomes-america-s-first-public-company-toacquire-a-public-benefit-corporation-in-conversation-with-plum-organics-cofounder
[http://perma.cc/49DR-BCQE]; Anthony Tagliente, Better Know a Deal: A First for Benefit
Corporations, TRIPLEPUNDIT (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.triplepundit.com/2015/08/better-knowdeal-first-benefit-corporations/# [http://perma.cc/LCG2-8375].
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well-known to date21). It likely is only a matter of time before we will see
the advent of publicly held U.S. benefit corporations.
With the likely prospect of publicly held U.S. benefit corporations in
mind, this Article engages in a thought experiment. Specifically, the
Article views the publicly held U.S. benefit corporation from the
perspective of litigation risk. It first situates, in Part I, the U.S. benefit
corporation in its structural and governance context as an incorporated
business association. Corporate purpose and the attendant managerial
authority, responsibilities, and fiduciary duties are the key points of
reference. Then, in Part II, the Article seeks to identify and describe the
salient, unique litigation risks that may be associated with publicly held
corporations with the structural and governance attributes of a benefit
corporation. These include both state litigation under the ultra vires
doctrine and similarly situated statutory causes of action, as well as actions
for breach of a corporate law fiduciary duty, and federal law causes of
action for securities fraud and misstatements. The reflections in Part III
draw conclusions from the synthesis of the observations made in Parts I
and II. Specifically, Part III links the importance of a publicly held benefit
corporation’s public benefit purpose to litigation risk management from
several perspectives. The commentary in Part III is intended to be of use
to government officials, policymakers, legal advisors of corporations,
benefit corporation management, and academic observers, among others.
I. WHAT MAKES A BENEFIT CORPORATION DIFFERENT?
In the United States, a benefit corporation is a type of for-profit
corporation organized under specially tailored provisions included in a
state’s corporate law.22 Benefit corporations are designed to facilitate the
use of the corporate form to conduct social enterprise—business that seeks
to benefit society or the environment as well as shareholders—or

21. See Hiroko Tabuchi, Etsy I.P.O. Tests Pledge to Balance Social Mission and Profit, N.Y.
TIMES: DEALBOOk (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/17/business/dealbook
/etsy-ipo-tests-pledge-to-emphasize-social-mission-over-profit.html?_r=0. Other publicly held B
Corps include or have included Brazil’s Natura Cosmeticos S.A. and Rally Software Development
Corp. (acquired by CA Technologies—CA, Inc.—in 2015). See Ariel Schwartz, A Public Company
Has Finally Become A B Corp, FASTCO.EXIST (Dec. 23, 2014, 8:18 AM), http://www.fast
coexist.com/3040158/a-public-company-has-finally-become-a-b-corp
[http://perma.cc/CW979KQK].
22. See Brett McDonnell, Benefit Corporations and Strategic Action Fields or (the Existential
Failing of Delaware), 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 263, 280 (2016) (“State statutes legally define benefit
corporations. These statutes sit atop the basic business corporation statute. That is, benefit corporations
are business corporations, subject to all of the rules of the business corporation statute, except insofar
as the benefit corporation statute provides different or additional rules. The statutes add just a few new
rules.”).
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otherwise engage in mission alignment.23 Specifically, benefit corporation
legislation was introduced in response to concerns that directors and
officers of social enterprises organized as corporations may be held liable
in court actions challenging their compliance with applicable fiduciary
duties.24
As a result, primary areas of focus in the substantive legal doctrine
include: (1) provisions on corporate purpose (defining the category and
scope of the corporation’s operating objectives, including principally the
benefit corporation’s public benefit25); (2) management authority; and (3)
fiduciary duties.26 Each of these features of benefit corporation law plays
23. See, e.g., McDonnell, supra note 22, at 264 (“Benefit corporations . . . are meant as a vehicle
for entrepreneurs and investors who want to be involved in social enterprises, that is, businesses
seeking both a healthy financial return for their investors while also committing to other socially
valuable goals.” (footnote omitted)); J. Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s
Public Benefit Corporation Law, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 345, 348 (2014) (“The benefit corporation
statute is the most widely adopted social enterprise statute.” (footnote omitted)).
24. The heart of the concern is that a court will find that board members or officers have breached
an applicable fiduciary duty by taking an action that the board determines to be in the best interest of
the corporation but fails to maximize financial benefits to shareholders. Two court opinions—Dodge
v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919), an “old chestnut” decided in the closely held corporate context
under Michigan law, and the more recent Delaware law opinion in Ebay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v.
Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 35 (Del. Ch. 2010)—are typically used to support the argument that corporate
management should fear this result. See Murray, supra note 1, at 13–17. Because social enterprises,
by their nature, exist to serve constituencies beyond shareholders and objectives beyond profit and
wealth maximization, promoters, directors, and officers of social enterprise firms may be especially
uneasy about the broad-based adoption of a rule requiring management to always act to maximize
financial benefits to shareholders in order to comply with applicable fiduciary duties.
25. In this Article, I generally use the term “corporate purpose” to narrowly refer to the purpose
of an individual corporation as stated in its corporate charter. Other corporate governance scholars and
commentators often use the term “corporate purpose” more broadly—in referring to the overall
purpose of the corporate form and in particular, the policy rational for its statutory existence and the
constituencies it is intended to serve and benefit. See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate
Form: Corporate Law and Benefit Corps., 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 269, 276–78 (2013) (using
“corporate purpose” in this broader sense).
26. Many commentators also point out the benefit corporation report as a core distinctive
component. See, e.g., McDonnell, supra note 22, at 280; J. Haskell Murray, An Early Report on Benefit
Reports, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 25, 30–33 (2015) [hereinafter Murray, Early Report]; Alicia E.
Plerhoples, Social Enterprise As Commitment: A Roadmap, 48 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 89, 104–105
(2015); Reiser, supra note 1, at 604; see also J. Haskell Murray, Understanding and Improving Benefit
Corporation Reporting, BUS. L. TODAY, July 2016, at 1 [hereinafter Murray, Understanding and
Improving]. However, not every state requires that a benefit report be filed, there is no remedy for
noncompliance, and many benefit corporations are not meeting their reporting requirements. See
generally Murray, Early Report, supra, at 31, 42–43 (cataloguing these matters). Accordingly, this
benefit corporation feature apparently does not independently impact litigation risk and this Article
omits it as a key feature. Of course, there are other distinctive aspects of public benefit corporation
law that deserve exploration, perhaps in another future article. Among those not well explored in the
literature to date (with minor exception): supermajority approval requirements for mergers with and
conversions into other corporations. See, e.g., J. Haskell Murray, Defending Patagonia: Mergers and
Acquisitions with Benefit Corporations, 9 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 485 (2013) [hereinafter Murray,
Defending Patagonia] (focusing generally on benefit corporation mergers through a hypothetical case
study).
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a distinct yet interconnected role in establishing the structure and
governance norms of a benefit corporation from a statutory perspective.
This Part describes the statutory provisions relating to these three doctrinal
focal points using examples from state benefit corporation statutes.
Together, these three aspects of benefit corporation doctrine provide a
foundational depiction of the nature of the benefit corporation as a
business association.
A. Corporate Purpose
Most modern statutory corporate law provisions outside the benefit
corporation context typically allow a corporation to be organized for any
lawful purpose.27 Some state corporation law statutes, notably the General
Corporation Law of the State of Delaware, known informally as the
Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL),28 require that a
corporation’s chartering document, typically called a certificate of
incorporation or articles of incorporation (charter), include a statement of
corporate purpose.29 Most state corporate statutes, including those
adopting the scheme established in the Model Business Corporation Act
(MBCA),30 allow a corporation to rely on the statute for the adoption of an
all-encompassing corporate purpose and make the inclusion of a charter
provision on corporate purpose permissive.31 Regardless of the source of
a corporation’s purpose (statute and charter or statute alone), for-profit
corporations, including social enterprises organized as corporations,
usually take advantage of the full breadth of the permitted purposes for
which a corporation can be organized and operated under the applicable
state law.32
Benefit corporation statutes are designed to change that norm. They
typically provide for mandatory charter provisions requiring certain
content. Specifically, to be organized as a benefit corporation, a firm must
27. See Johnson, supra note 25, at 282 (“[A]ll corporate statutes are silent and agnostic on
purpose, speaking to ‘purpose’ only by way of permitting a corporation to conduct ‘any lawful
business or purposes.’”) (footnotes omitted); Adam J. Sulkowski & Kent Greenfield, A Bridle, A Prod,
and A Big Stick: An Evaluation of Class Actions, Shareholder Proposals, and the Ultra Vires Doctrine
As Methods for Controlling Corporate Behavior, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 929, 945–48 (2005) (“While
the requirement of listing specific corporate purposes and powers was removed from state
incorporation laws, the requirement that the corporation’s purposes and activities be ‘lawful’ or ‘legal’
was never removed.”).
28. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101–398 (2016).
29. See § 102(a)(3).
30. See generally MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1984).
31. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(2)(i) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1984).
32. See Sulkowski & Greenfield, supra note 27, at 947–48 (setting forth examples that illustrate
this point). Yet, the MBCA and state statutes based on it allow corporations to provide for more
specific corporate purposes in their chartering documents. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(2)(i)
(AM. BAR ASS’N 1984).
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expressly set forth in its charter a general or specific public benefit
purpose—a purpose to benefit society or the environment.33
These requirements for and definitions of public benefit are variously
specified from state to state. Appendix 1 provides a chart summarizing the
requirements for general versus specific public benefit purposes in the
states adopting benefit corporation statutes. Definitions of general public
benefit and specific public benefit from the various state statutes are
included in Appendix 2.
Most states require that the charter include a general public benefit
to both society and the environment and permit the charter to include one
or more specific public benefit purposes.34 The Colorado, Delaware, and
Tennessee statutes require the statement of at least one public benefit
purpose.35 Minnesota law provides for two discrete types of benefit
corporation based on the type of public benefit provided for in the
charter—a general benefit corporation and a specific benefit corporation.36
State statutes define general public benefit in a relatively consistent
manner. These definitions typically provide that general public benefit
comprises a “material positive impact on society and the environment,
taken as a whole, assessed against a third-party standard, from the business
and operations of a benefit corporation.”37 Some statutes omit the
reference to a third-party standard.38
Statutory definitions of specific public benefit differ more widely,
although still within a relatively narrow range. The key benefits called out
in these statutes include:
 serving low-income or underserved individuals or communities;
 fostering extraordinary economic opportunity or economic
development for individuals or communities;
 protecting, preserving, or restoring the environment;
 bettering human health;
 stimulating the arts, sciences, or development of knowledge;

33. See infra apps. 1 and 2; see infra text accompanying notes 34–41.
34. These states include Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, West Virginia, and Washington, D.C. See infra apps. 1 and 2.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. States with this specific definition include Arizona, Arkansas, Illinois, Louisiana, Nebraska,
New York, and Rhode Island. See infra app. 2.
38. New Jersey’s and Oregon’s statutes are examples. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-1 (West
2016); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.750 (West 2016). See generally infra app. 2 (recording these and
other general purpose definitions in state benefit corporation statutes).
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improving the flow of capital to entities with a public benefit
purpose; and
advancing society or the environment in another identifiable
manner.39

Several states include broad introductory language contextualizing the
specified benefits.40 Certain states also tweak the individual expressions
of the specific benefits listed in the statute.41
Examples of benefit purposes from actual corporate charters may
help illustrate the overall import of these various statutory expressions of
a required benefit purpose. Tennessee for-profit benefit corporation
SaveMomLife Corporation reports a public benefit purpose “to inspire,
motivate and uplift mothers of all ages and races through mentoring
programs and support services geared in the areas of advancing family,
business and spiritual growth.”42 IFATHOM, INC., another for-profit
benefit corporation organized under Tennessee law, “intends to
pursue . . . economic and social capital development among youth
demographics via entrepreneurial problem-solving, project-based learning
and community engagement.”43 Beta Bionics, Inc., a Massachusetts
benefit corporation, has “the purpose of creating a general public benefit,
with a specific public benefit of improving human health.”44 And the
articles of incorporation of Jason Wiener, P.C., a Colorado public benefit
corporation, include a lengthier public benefit purpose:
(a) to create material, positive general public benefit, including but
not limited to: (i) providing legal and business consulting services to
start-up ventures, and mission-centered social and environmental
enterprises; (ii) promoting democratized ownership structures; and
(iii) advancing clean and distributed energy; (b) to engage in the
transaction of all lawful business or pursue any other lawful purpose
or purposes for which a PBC may be incorporated under Colorado
39. See generally infra app. 2 (documenting the contents of specific purpose definitions in state
benefit corporation statutes).
40. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-130 (2015) (“‘Specific public benefit purpose’ means a
benefit that serves one or more public welfare, religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational
purposes, or other purposes or benefits beyond the strict interest of the shareholders of the benefit
corporation.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782 (2015) (“‘Specific public benefit’ means a benefit that
serves one or more public welfare, religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes,
or other purpose or benefit beyond the strict interest of the shareholders of the benefit corporation.”).
41. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3302 (2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03 (2016). See
generally infra app. 2.
42. Charter, SaveMomLife Corporation, art. 12 (on file with author).
43. Articles of Amendment for Restatement Charter, IFATHOM, INC., art. 3 (on file with
author).
44. Third Amended and Restated Articles of Organization, Beta Bionics, Inc., art. II, at
http://corp.sec.state.ma.us/CorpWeb/CorpSearch/CorpSearchViewPDF.aspx.
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law; and (c) to have, enjoy, and exercise all of the rights, powers, and
privileges conferred upon PBCs incorporated pursuant to Colorado
law, whether now or hereafter in effect, and whether or not herein
specifically mentioned.45

Many of the benefit purposes set forth in benefit corporation chartering
documents could easily be pursued by either a for-profit or nonprofit firm.
Charter-based descriptions of a corporate purpose are always
important as a frame for a board of directors’ decision-making in any
corporation. In a benefit corporation, however, corporate purpose is much
more central as a matter of statutory law than it is in legislative enactments
governing other for-profit corporations. The importance of a benefit
corporation’s general or specific public benefit becomes more apparent
when viewed through the lens of the statutorily defined management
authority and responsibility and fiduciary duties.
B. Management Authority and Responsibilities
For the most part, U.S. benefit corporation legislation adopts the
management structure of a for-profit corporation organized under the
general corporate law of the jurisdiction of incorporation without regard
to the benefit corporation rules. However, a significant number of U.S
benefit corporation statutes require that an annual benefit report be filed
and mandate the designation of a “benefit corporation director” (either
generally or if the firm is a publicly held corporation) or provide for the
optional designation of a benefit director—a board member who is
responsible for preparing a compliance opinion for inclusion in the benefit
report.46 These benefit corporation statutes may exculpate a benefit
director from personal liability for conduct undertaken in that capacity
(within express limits).47 In almost all of those jurisdictions requiring an
annual benefit report filing, the benefit corporation statute provides for an
45. First Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation, Jason Wiener, P.C., art. III, at
http://www.sos.state.co.us/biz/ViewImage.do?fileId=20141486758&masterFileId=20141023819.
46. See infra app. 3 (summarizing information about benefit director and officer provisions in
the various state benefit corporation statutes). A recent article notes that the rate of compliance with
benefit report filing requirements has been very low. See Murray, Early Report, supra note 26, at
34–35 (summarizing a limited test of benefit corporations in four states); see also Murray,
Understanding and Improving, supra note 26.
47. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-410(F) (2016) (“[A] benefit director is not personally
liable for monetary damages for any act or omission taken in that capacity unless the act or omission
constitutes a transaction from which the director derived an improper personal benefit, willful
misconduct, or a knowing violation of law.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.10(f) (2016) (“[A] benefit
director shall not be personally liable for any act or omission taken in his or her official capacity as a
benefit director unless the act or omission is not in good faith, involves intentional misconduct or a
knowing violation of law, or involves a transaction from which the director directly or indirectly
derived an improper personal benefit.”).
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optional “benefit officer” who is responsible for preparing the benefit
report and exercising powers and duties designated in the bylaws or by
resolution of the board.48 A chart summarizing the current statutes
providing for benefit directors and benefit officers is attached as Appendix
3. Overall, these positions exist to help establish and ensure compliance
with the corporation’s public benefit.
U.S. benefit corporation legislation also may include a provision
tailoring corporate management objectives. For example, Tennessee law
provides that “[a] for-profit benefit corporation shall be managed in a
manner that considers the best interests of those materially affected by the
corporation’s conduct, including the pecuniary interests of shareholders,
and the public benefit or public benefits identified in its charter.”49 Similar
provisions exist in other state benefit corporation laws. In most cases, they
are included in the provision defining the concept of a benefit corporation
under that state’s law.50 This type of management provision directly
connects the benefit corporation’s expressed charter-based public benefit
to the managerial function.
C. Fiduciary Duties
Director standards of conduct (and, if provided for under state law,
officer standards of conduct)51 in the U.S. benefit corporation context
typically derive from both the general standards of conduct under the
jurisdiction of incorporation’s for-profit corporation law and the specific
corporation’s articulated public benefit. Specifically, although state laws
vary, benefit corporation statutes relating to director fiduciary duties may:
 incorporate by reference the general standards of conduct from
the state corporate law;

48. See infra app. 3 (indicating states with benefit officer provisions).
49. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-28-104(d) (2015).
50. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a) (2016). Specifically, the definition provides that:
A “public benefit corporation” is a for-profit corporation organized under and subject to
the requirements of this chapter that is intended to produce a public benefit or public
benefits and to operate in a responsible and sustainable manner. To that end, a public
benefit corporation shall be managed in a manner that balances the stockholders’
pecuniary interests, the best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s
conduct, and the public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of
incorporation.
Id. (emphasis added). See also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-101-503(1) (2016) (providing a
similar definition).
51. Although some U.S. benefit corporation statutes only call out director standards of conduct
(leaving officer standards of conduct to the general corporate statutory and decisional law rules), some
state acts do provide express standards of conduct for officers. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 33-1360 (2016); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/4.10 (2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.11
(2016).
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mandate, in satisfaction of the directors’ overall positional duties
and considering the best interests of the corporation, board
consideration of the effects of corporate action or inaction on the
corporation’s general or specific public benefit and, in many
statutes, on various constituencies (including shareholders,
employees, customers, and the community), the environment,
and short-term and long-term corporate interests;
disavow a requirement that the board prioritize, in its
decision-making, shareholder financial interests or any other
interest not identified as a priority interest in the corporation’s
charter;
state that a director complying with the statutory standard of
conduct is not liable for that conduct as a director;
expressly permit a benefit corporation to include in its charter a
provision declaring that any disinterested failure to satisfy the
statutory standard of conduct does not constitute a breach of the
duty of loyalty; and
deny that any director owes a duty to a beneficiary of the public
benefit purpose because of that person’s status as a beneficiary.52

Professor Lyman Johnson notes that these provisions generally connect
the benefit corporation’s best interests to its public benefit.53 However, he
also aptly notes that many benefit corporation statutes then “take an odd
turn” when they require the board to consider, along with that public
benefit, constituencies other than those related to the public benefit.54
Some states, however, have a different scheme for director standards
of conduct—one that does not require the consideration of specific named
stakeholders unconnected to the corporation’s actions or public benefit.
Tennessee law, for example, provides that, to comply with his or her
fiduciary duty:

52. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT., § 10-2431 (2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-1358 (2016);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.607 (2016); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A.201 (2016). The listed attributes of
state benefit corporation statutes addressing director fiduciary duties represent an aggregate sampling
and are relatively typical, but (as the text notes) there is some variance from state to state.
53. See Johnson, supra note 25, at 288–89 (noting that by “keeping the focus on the corporation
rather than on one stakeholder within the corporation, the [benefit corporation] statutes . . . coherently
align the corporation’s best interests with the ongoing pursuit of the purpose(s) for which the
corporation was formed”).
54. See id. at 289 (noting that benefit corporation laws of this kind “seem to formulate fiduciary
duties in stakeholder terms, not in terms of the corporation’s best interests or furthering corporate
purposes”).

624

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 40:611

[A] director shall consider the effects of any contemplated, proposed,
or actual transaction or other conduct on the interests of those
materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, including the
pecuniary interests of shareholders, and the public benefit or public
benefits identified in its charter and shall not give regular,
presumptive, or permanent priority to the interests of any individual
constituency or limited group of constituencies materially affected by
the corporation’s conduct, including the pecuniary interests of
shareholders.55

Delaware law focuses on a balancing of interests rather than a
consideration of interests, providing that
[t]he board of directors shall manage or direct the business and affairs
of the public benefit corporation in a manner that balances the
pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the best interests of those
materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific
public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of
incorporation.56

Colorado’s Benefit Corporation Act takes an almost identical approach to
that taken under the Delaware law, requiring that
[t]he board of directors . . . manage or direct the business and affairs
of a public benefit corporation in a manner that balances the
pecuniary interests of the shareholders, the best interests of those
materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific
public benefit identified in its articles of incorporation.57

Yet, both Delaware and Colorado benefit corporation law (like the benefit
corporation laws of many other states, as noted at the end of the bullet

55. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-28-106(a) (2016). Like the more typical U.S benefit corporation
statutes, the Tennessee statute goes on to disclaim director duties to those with an interest in the
corporation’s public benefit, provide that compliance with the statutory duty prevents a director from
being held liable, and allow the corporation’s charter to provide that a “disinterested failure” to satisfy
the board’s express standard of conduct does not “constitute an act or omission not in good faith, or a
breach of the duty of loyalty” for fiduciary duty and indemnification purposes. § 48-28-106 (b) to (c).
56. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(a) (2016). The statute then proceeds, like the similar Tennessee
provision, with duty and liability disclaimers (with a director discharging his or her fiduciary duties
“if such director’s decision is both informed and disinterested and not such that no person of ordinary,
sound judgment would approve”) and an express authorization to include in the corporation’s charter
a provision obviating claims of bad faith and breach of the duty of loyalty (whether for fiduciary duty
or indemnification purposes) if the failure to satisfy the standard of conduct is disinterested.
§ 365(b)–(c).
57. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-101-506(1) (2016). The statute then continues much like the
Delaware act, except that the permissive charter provision negating bad faith and breach of the duty
of loyalty appears to be conditioned on whether the individual director at issue is disinterested.
§ 7-101-506(2) to (3).
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point list of common fiduciary duty provisions provided above)58
expressly disclaim that directors owe fiduciary duties to the various named
stakeholder beneficiaries.59
The statutory expressions of benefit corporation management
fiduciary duties differ from state to state. However, in each U.S. benefit
corporation law, there is an unsurprising, fundamental anchoring
proposition: the law requires directors (and, as applicable, officers) to
consider the corporation’s public benefit in addition to any financial
interest of shareholders.60 In this regard, Professor Alicia Plerhoples
writes:
A benefit corporation’s board and its individual directors are tasked
with considering the impact of corporate actions on various
stakeholders and the corporation’s general public benefit. Similarly,
all officers of the corporation must consider the impact of the
corporate actions on stakeholders if “the officer has discretion to act
with respect to a matter” and “it reasonably appears to the officer that
the matter may have a material effect on the creation by the benefit
corporation of general public benefit or a specific public
benefit . . . .”61

As a result, corporate purpose (in the form of the benefit corporation’s
public benefit or benefits) is an important foundation for fiduciary duty
compliance in the U.S. benefit corporation.
Thus, as the reader may have foreseen, the specific corporate purpose
of a U.S. benefit corporation is a focal point for corporate organization and
operations. The central role of corporate purpose in the benefit corporation
context—from chartering through management dictates and fiduciary
duties—suggests (among other things) particular litigation risks attendant
to a benefit corporation’s stated public benefit or benefits. Identifying and
describing these distinctive risks is important to both entity choice and a
firm’s decision to raise capital in a public market.
II. WHAT MAY BE THE KEY LITIGATION RISKS FOR PUBLICLY HELD
U.S. BENEFIT CORPORATIONS?
This Article focuses on litigation risk in the public company context.
Having identified that specific focus, it is important to note two
foundational conceptual matters relative to litigation risk in this setting—
first, that the causes of action in the private and publicly held benefit
58. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
59. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-101-506(2)(a); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(b).
60. See Murray, supra note 1, at 33 (“Benefit corporation statutes state that directors must
consider multiple stakeholders in each and every decision they make.”).
61. Plerhoples, supra note 26, at 117 (quoting MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 301(a) (2014)).
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corporation milieu may be quite similar to the extent they emanate from
state corporate law and second, that a publicly held benefit corporation in
the United States is likely to have a litigation risk profile that is much the
same at its core as that for a publicly held U.S. corporation in general.
These two fundamental observations expose certain litigation risks and
focus attention on several principal causes of action that are likely to be
significant challenges for publicly held U.S. benefit corporations. The
remainder of this Part illuminates both the observations and the key causes
of action.
State law claims based on corporate law are largely independent of a
corporation’s private or public ownership. The likelihood that claims will
be brought, however, may be greater in a publicly held social enterprise
corporation because shareholders and their objectives may be less
homogeneous. In particular, individual holders of widely dispersed
publicly held shares likely have no preexisting relationship with the firm
or each other and may not weigh or balance the relative values of the
financial, social, or environmental corporate purposes of a benefit
corporation, as applicable, the same way.62 Managerial agency costs to
shareholders may be less uniform and less certain than in a firm primarily
aligned toward the production of shareholder financial wealth. In addition,
some commentators have observed that publicly held firms are stronger
magnets for litigation in the wake of twenty-first century regulatory
reforms, including specifically the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.63
Accordingly, while the nature of state corporate law claims may be the
same for publicly held corporations as it is for privately held corporations,
litigation risk may be higher for publicly held firms than for privately held
firms.
A publicly held benefit corporation in the United States shares
litigation risk with publicly held U.S. corporations in general; many
relevant trends in litigation involving publicly held firms generally would
appear to be transferable in the publicly held U.S. benefit corporation
setting. For example, shareholder litigation involving mergers and
acquisitions has been prevalent among U.S. public companies (although
perhaps is now declining somewhat),64 as has shareholder litigation
62. See, e.g., McDonnell, supra note 22, at 274 (“Public corporations, which are larger due to
their publicly-traded shares, typically have thousands of shareholders, none of whom control the
business. Most shareholders have no personal ties to the business, and institutional investors own a
majority of the shares.”).
63. See, e.g., Eric L. Talley, Public Ownership, Firm Governance, and Litigation Risk, 76 U.
CHI. L. REV. 335, 336–37 (2009).
64. See RAVI SINHA, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING
ACQUISITIONS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES: REVIEW OF 2015 AND 1H 2016 M&A LITIGATION (2016),
https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Shareholder-Litigation-Involving-Acquisitions-
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involving exclusive forum selection bylaws and other intra-corporate
litigation management processes.65 Opportunistic behavior of the
plaintiffs’ bar is a key driver of overall public company litigation trends in
the for-profit corporation setting generally.66 One would expect that
behavior to have similar impacts on litigation trends involving (and,
therefore, the litigations risks for) publicly held benefit corporations
specifically.
Given these general observations, a publicly held U.S. benefit
corporation should expect that disgruntled shareholders desiring to
vindicate their complaints would focus primarily on state actions alleging
a breach of fiduciary duty and federal actions for securities fraud. Yet, the
importance of corporate purpose in the benefit corporation and the
introduction of statutory causes of action raises the specter of state law
claims outside the fiduciary duty context that are uncommon in publicly
held firms not organized as benefit corporations. Moreover, the context
and nuances of fiduciary duty and securities fraud actions brought against
a publicly held U.S. benefit corporation may be different from those for
similar causes of action against the typical publicly held U.S. corporation
not organized as a benefit corporation.
Specifically, a shareholder grievance against a publicly held benefit
corporation is likely to include claims that the corporation has taken action
or is operating outside the scope of its promised social enterprise
objectives (i.e., its corporate purpose).67 Accordingly, shareholder
2016 [https://perma.cc/QY33-G43H] (documenting recent trends in public company merger and
acquisition litigation).
65. See, e.g., Verity Winship, Shareholder Litigation by Contract, 96 B.U. L. REV. 485 (2016)
(describing the debates and analyzing recent legal actions involving these shareholder litigation
management tactics).
66. See, e.g., Brian Cheffins et al., Delaware Corporate Litigation and the Fragmentation of the
Plaintiffs’ Bar, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 427 (describing general trends affecting the plaintiffs’ bar
and their contribution to shareholder/investor litigation).
67. These claims effectively constitute investor claims of greenwashing akin to those raised by
consumers based on alleged false advertising of products or services. See Miriam A. Cherry, The Law
and Economics of Corporate Social Responsibility and Greenwashing, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 281,
282 (2014) (“Greenwashing occurs when a corporation increases its sales or boosts its brand image
through environmental rhetoric or advertising, but in reality does not make good on these
environmental claims.”); Mitch Nass, Note, The Viability of Benefit Corporations: An Argument for
Greater Transparency and Accountability, 39 J. CORP. L. 875, 877 (2014) (“‘Greenwashing’ is a
marketing strategy that seeks to capitalize on the demand for socially conscious corporations’ products
and services provided by advertising green initiatives that may or may not accurately represent the
company’s actual goals and behavior.”). Investment greenwashing has been a concern in benefit
corporation legislation. See, e.g., Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 1, at 33 (“[W]ithout
at least some minimal level of board accountability, the benefit corporation statute could be an avenue
to greenwashing and faux CSR rather than an antidote to them.”); Kennan Khatib, Comment, The
Harms of the Benefit Corporation, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 151, 151 (2015) (asserting that the benefit
corporation form encourages greenwashing); Herrick K. Lidstone, Jr., The Long and Winding Road to
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disputes might be vindicated through state law ultra vires actions (legal
proceedings alleging that corporate action is beyond the scope of the
powers that the corporation has the authority to exercise)68 and statutory
causes of action designed to hold a benefit corporation to its promised
public benefit or benefits. Similarly, state fiduciary duty and federal
securities fraud actions against publicly held U.S. benefit corporations
might focus on the benefit corporation’s failure to conduct its business and
operations in a manner consistent with its public benefit or benefits. This
Part briefly explores these potential causes of action.
A. State Law Actions
Publicly held U.S. benefit corporations with shareholder complaints
about the firm’s adherence to its corporate purpose should expect to see
ultra vires and similar statutory claims brought under state corporate law
focusing specifically on those complaints.69 However, the facts underlying
that type of action may also support a claim that the corporate directors
breached their fiduciary duties under state corporate law—specifically a
breach of the duty of loyalty and, if a separately constituted legal action, a
breach of good faith.70 The likelihood that any of these state-law-based
cases will be brought depends on, among other things, the precise facts at
issue and the remedies sought; facts may not be sufficient to support a
particular claim, or a viable claim may not allow an aggrieved claimant to
a desired remedy.71 For example, shareholders may be able to prevail on a
Public Benefit Corporations in Colorado, COLO. LAW., Jan. 2014, at 39, 44–45 (describing aspects of
the greenwashing issue in the benefit corporation context).
68. See, e.g., Charles E. Carpenter, Should the Doctrine of Ultra Vires Be Discarded?, 33 YALE
L.J. 49, 49 (1923) (“If the corporation enters into a transaction which is beyond the powers expressly
or impliedly contained in the charter or articles of incorporation or in violation of the statutory
restriction, the transaction is said to be ultra vires, i.e., beyond the powers of the corporation.”);
Michael A. Schaeftler, The Purpose Clause in the Certificate of Incorporation: A Clause in Search of
a Purpose, 58 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 476, 478 (2012) (“An attempt by a corporation to act beyond its
purposes or powers is considered to be an ultra vires activity . . . .”).
69. Although this is the author’s prediction, others have acknowledged the possibility of legal
action on ultra vires actions involving benefit corporations. See, e.g., John Tyler et al., Producing
Better Mileage: Advancing the Design and Usefulness of Hybrid Vehicles for Social Business
Ventures, 33 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 235, 265 (2015) (“Perhaps an attorney general might be able to
assert that a given benefit corporation’s activities are ultra vires if they did not consider the effects of
their decisions on the designated interests, and two thirds of the shareholders did not vote to ratify the
actions or convert to regular corporate status.”).
70. Legal actions for breach of fiduciary duty are often brought as shareholder derivative actions
against directors and officers and not against the corporation itself. See infra note 116 and
accompanying text (on derivative actions for breach of fiduciary duty). Nevertheless, the subject
corporation is an active player in shareholder derivative litigation and bears litigation risk (albeit not
the prospect of a detrimental monetary judgment) as a result.
71. This is endemic to the process of choosing an optimal cause of action through which to
pursue a claim for wrongful conduct. See, e.g., McFaul v. Ramsey, 61 U.S. 523, 525 (1857) (“The
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claim that benefit corporation directors approved a corporate transaction
that is beyond the corporation’s powers as defined by statutory law and
the corporation’s charter, entitling them to injunctive relief; yet, the
directors’ approval of the transaction may not have violated applicable
standards of conduct or liability that would result in damages payable to
the corporation. In all, the specifics of fiduciary duty law, general
corporate law, and benefit corporation law make it unlikely that benefit
corporations and their managers will be held liable.72
To illustrate these points about state law claims in the publicly held
benefit corporation context, a summary of certain general related
considerations under benefit corporation law may be helpful. The
remainder of this Part provides that summary. Unless otherwise noted,
although the focus of the analysis is publicly held benefit corporations, the
causes of action, claims, and limitations described in this Part are available
in court proceedings involving privately held or publicly held benefit
corporations.
1. Ultra Vires and Similar Statutory Claims
A corporation acting outside the bounds of its statutory and
charter-based purposes and powers to act often is said to be acting in a
manner that is ultra vires.73
Through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the ultra vires
doctrine was central to corporate law. Limiting the corporation’s
legal authority to certain powers enumerated in the corporate charter,
the doctrine was considered an important tool to protect the state’s
interest in restricting the power and size of corporations and to protect
the shareholders from managerial overreaching.74

While the doctrine has not been an active basis for legal actions (especially
since the advent of general corporate purpose clauses75), it continues to be
a possible litigable claim.76
distinction between the different forms of actions for different wrongs, requiring different remedies,
lies in the nature of things . . . .”).
72. See Murray, supra note 1, at 33–36 (noting and explaining this overall difficulty in holding
benefit corporation directors accountable for their allegedly wrongful corporate conduct).
73. See Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (with
Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1302
(2001) (“Traditionally, the corporation’s powers were limited to the explicit objects of the corporation
as defined in the corporate charter.”).
74. Greenfield, supra note 73, at 1302.
75. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
76. See generally Greenfield, supra note 73, at 1360 (“[T]he traditional doctrine of ultra vires,
thought to be defunct, is in fact alive in important respects.”); Sulkowsi & Greenfield, supra note 27,
at 930 (“[T]he [ultra vires] doctrine was almost done away with during the 1900s inasmuch as
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To that point, “[t]he incorporation statutes of forty-nine states allow
these states to dissolve a corporation or enjoin it from engaging in ultra
vires activities—that is, activities outside of the corporation’s authority.”77
In a 2005 law review article, Professors Adam Sulkowski and Kent
Greenfield identify advantages and disadvantages to ultra vires actions.78
While actions alleging ultra vires activity are not often discussed as a
litigation alternative, they seem like a more obvious option in the benefit
corporation context given the distinguishing and strong role of corporate
purpose in the benefit corporation form.
The ultra vires doctrine protects the shareholders’ interest in the firm
more broadly than a pure financial wealth maximization norm.
[T]he doctrine “was seen as essential for the protection of the
investing public.” The notion was that shareholders made investment
decisions based in part on the scope of permissible business activities
in which a corporation could engage. The specific activities listed in
the corporate charter were regarded as an important part of the
“contract” between shareholders and the firm (and its management).
It was assumed that shareholders cared which activities the firm
engaged in, and if the firm went beyond the activities specified in the
corporate charter it was a violation of the firm’s contractual duty to
the shareholders. The ultra vires doctrine enforced the limitation on
the corporation’s activities even when the unauthorized venture was
likely to be profitable.79

We may presume that the corporation’s articulated benefit purpose
motivates shareholder investments in benefit corporations, and as a result,
we may expect a high level of shareholder engagement with the adherence
of board and officer conduct to that benefit purpose. Accordingly, a
publicly held benefit corporation with disaffected shareholders should
expect ultra vires litigation if the shareholder complaints include a failure
of the corporation to adhere to its articulated corporate purpose.

companies are now free to alter their field of business as they wish, a narrow slice of this doctrine
remains.”).
77. Sulkowsi & Greenfield, supra note 27, at 945.
78. See id. at 949–52. The stated advantages include: “no ambiguous standard or difficult
threshold to hurdle,” “fewer unforeseeable contingencies and fewer evidentiary burdens,” and “the
remedies allowed for in all states except North Dakota are either equitable relief (including
injunctions) or the dissolution of the company.” Id. at 949. Two obstacles to a successful ultra vires
claim are identified: “producing evidence that a company is presently engaging in unlawful conduct
and then convincing the judge to use the court’s powers in equity to enforce the relevant law by
requiring action or the cessation of action by the company.” Id. at 950. The coauthors further note that
“[t]he key limitation to the ultra vires doctrine is that it will work only when a corporation is violating
a law in a jurisdiction where it is engaged in a business activity.” Id. at 961–52.
79. Greenfield, supra note 73, at 1304–05 (footnotes omitted).
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In seeming recognition of this fact, laws in many states adopting the
benefit corporation form create an express statutory cause of action to
enforce compliance with the corporation’s public benefit, most often
called a “benefit enforcement proceeding.”80 The action may be brought
directly or derivatively, but derivative plaintiffs must meet a relatively
high threshold level of share ownership (typically 2% or 5% beneficial or
record ownership) to have standing.81 The plaintiff in a benefit
enforcement proceeding cannot seek monetary damages for the benefit
corporation’s “failure . . . to [pursue or] create a general public benefit or
any specific public benefit.”82 However, benefit corporation statutes
typically provide for the reimbursement of the plaintiff’s attorney fees if a
court determines that the failed compliance is “without substantial
justification” or “without justification.”83 Finally, benefit corporation
statutes providing for benefit enforcement proceedings may foreclose

80. See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser, Regulating Social Enterprise, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 231,
239 (2014) (“[B]enefit corporations [sic] shareholders can sue to enforce directors’ obligations,
including in a special benefit enforcement proceeding authorized by many statutes”); Nass, supra note
67, at 886 (“The unique enforcement provision that many benefit corporation statutes share is the
benefit enforcement proceeding. This is a right of action granted to company insiders who seek
enforcement of the company’s duty to further a public benefit.”) (footnotes omitted). Research for this
Article in March 2016 identified benefit enforcement proceeding provisions in the benefit corporation
laws of the following states: California, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and South Carolina.
81. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-1362(c) (West 2014):
A benefit enforcement proceeding may be commenced or maintained only (1) directly by
the benefit corporation, or (2) derivatively in accordance with the provisions of chapter 601
by (A) a person or group of persons that owns beneficially or of record not less than five
per cent of the total number of shares of a class or series outstanding at the time of the act
or omission complained of, (B) a person or group of persons that owns beneficially or of
record ten per cent or more of the outstanding equity interests in an entity of which the
benefit corporation is a majority-owned subsidiary at the time of the act or omission
complained of, or (C) other persons as specified in the certificate of incorporation or bylaws
of the benefit corporation.
82. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-1362(b) (“A benefit corporation shall not be liable
for monetary damages under sections 33-1352–33-1364, inclusive, for any failure of the benefit
corporation to pursue or create a general public benefit or any specific public benefit.”); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 35-1-1412(3) (2015) (“A benefit corporation is not liable for monetary damages for any failure
of the benefit corporation to create general public benefit or a specific public benefit.”).
83. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-19-272(a) (1987) (“[I]n any civil action commenced or appealed
in any court of record in this state, the court shall award . . . reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs against
any attorney or party, or both, who has brought a civil action, or asserted a claim therein, or interposed
a defense, that a court determines to be without substantial justification, either in whole or part.”);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1412(4) (“If the court in a benefit enforcement proceeding finds that a
failure to comply with this part was without justification, the court may award an amount sufficient to
reimburse the plaintiff for the reasonable expenses incurred by the plaintiff, including attorney fees
and expenses, in connection with the benefit enforcement proceeding.”).
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ultra vires actions as a matter of positive law.84 Accordingly, as a means
of holding benefit corporations and their management to the corporation’s
chartered benefit purpose, the benefit enforcement proceeding is a
relatively dominant, albeit weak (because of the limits on plaintiffs and
the unavailability of monetary damages), accountability tool, and the
statutes providing for it may preclude common law ultra vires claims.85
2. Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims
Benefit corporation shareholder dissatisfaction may also manifest
itself in actions for breach of fiduciary duty—whether alleged to occur in
the general, ongoing monitoring or management of the corporation or in
specific decision-making on transactions or other conduct. These actions
may assert traditional fiduciary duty claims (e.g., that the directors have
acted in a manner inconsistent with good faith or the duties of care or
loyalty)86 or claims that the directors failed to discharge the specific
standards of conduct made applicable to them under the state’s benefit
corporation statute (detailed supra Part I.3).
Delaware judicial opinions constitute the leading body of corporate
fiduciary duty law in the United States and are especially important for
existing publicly traded firms (which are overwhelmingly Delaware
corporations).87 To the extent that current Delaware fiduciary duty law
directs corporate boards or officers to prioritize shareholder interests
(especially financial wealth interests) over either the firm’s chartered
corporate purpose or nonshareholder constituencies required to be
considered under benefit corporation statutes,88 we may expect that law to
84. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-1362(a) (“Except in a benefit enforcement
proceeding, no person may bring an action or assert a claim against a benefit corporation or its directors
or officers with respect to . . . the failure to pursue or create a general public benefit or any specific
public benefit identified in its certificate of incorporation . . . .”); 15 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3325(a)(1) (West 2013) (“Except in a benefit enforcement proceeding, no person may bring an action
or assert a claim against a benefit corporation or its directors or officers with respect to . . . failure to
pursue or create general public benefit or a specific public benefit set forth in its articles.”).
85. Accord Nass, supra note 67, at 886–88 (engaging a similar analysis).
86. Director liability for monetary damages for a failure to discharge the duty of care are
discounted here because of the prevalence of exculpation provisions, but breaches of the duty of care
may be alleged against officers or to seek equitable relief or contest the applicability of the business
judgment rule. See Julian Velasco, A Defense of the Corporate Law Duty of Care, 40 J. CORP. L. 647,
656–57 (2015).
87. See Lisa L. Casey, Twenty-Eight Words: Enforcing Corporate Fiduciary Duties through
Criminal Prosecution of Honest Services Fraud, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (2010) (“Executives of most
public companies look to Delaware law for the content and enforcement of their fiduciary duties.”);
Pamela Mathy, Honest Services Fraud After Skilling, 42 ST. MARY’S L.J. 645, 723 (2011) (“It is well
accepted that many public companies incorporate in Delaware to ensure that Delaware law’s limitation
on director and officer personal liability will apply to any alleged breaches of fiduciary duties.”).
88. The potential application of Revlon duties in a benefit corporation context provides an
example. This is an uncertain area under benefit corporation law, to say the least. See, e.g., infra notes
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be inapplicable in any judicial review of board conduct in the benefit
corporation setting. Yet, those expectations may not be valid. Over time,
judicial opinions interpreting managerial fiduciary duties in the benefit
corporation context will offer us insights on the elements of general
corporate fiduciary duty law that apply under benefit corporation law.
Benefit corporation legislation compromises the relative certainty and
predictability of Delaware fiduciary duty law.
Delaware law’s treatment of good faith questions may lead to
different results in the application of benefit corporation fiduciary duty law
in the various states. Delaware law conceptualizes good faith as a
component of the duty of loyalty.89 As previously noted, benefit
corporation statutes may allow a benefit corporation to provide in its
charter that disinterested failures to comply with the statutory standards of
conduct are not actionable as breaches of the duty of loyalty.90 As a result,
actions against Delaware benefit corporations for breach of fiduciary duty
alleging a lack of good faith would not be available in firms with those
charter provisions unless the allegations of bad faith also included facts
establishing self-interest. However, courts applying the fiduciary duty law
of jurisdictions that recognize a separate cause of action for breach of good
faith claims may allow those claims to proceed notwithstanding the
corporation’s inclusion of the permitted charter provisions excepting
disinterested conduct from the duty of loyalty.91

108–111 and accompanying text. See generally Sean W. Brownridge, Canning Plum Organics: The
Avant-Garde Campbell Soup Company Acquisition and Delaware Public Benefit Corporations
Wandering Revlon-Land, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 703 (2015) (noting the uncertainty, positing solutions to
key questions, and proposing a new framework); Alicia E. Plerhoples, Can an Old Dog Learn New
Tricks? Applying Traditional Corporate Law Principles to New Social Enterprise Legislation, 13
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 221 (2012) (examining the Revlon doctrine in the flexible purpose
corporation context).
89. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (“[T]he
fiduciary duty of loyalty is not limited to cases involving a financial or other cognizable fiduciary
conflict of interest. It also encompasses cases where the fiduciary fails to act in good faith.”).
90. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (representing a list of typical provisions in benefit
corporation statutes, including provisions that “expressly permit a benefit corporation to include in its
charter a provision declaring that any disinterested failure to satisfy the statutory standard of conduct
does not constitute a breach of the duty of loyalty”).
91. Both Colorado and Tennessee law address this possibility directly in their respective statutes.
See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-101-506(3) (West 2014) (“The articles of incorporation of a public
benefit corporation may include a provision that a disinterested director’s failure to satisfy this section
does not, for the purposes of section 7-108-401 or article 109 of this title, constitute an act or omission
not in good faith or a breach of the duty of loyalty.” (emphasis added)); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 48-28-106(c) (West 2016) (“The charter of a for-profit benefit corporation may include a provision
that any disinterested failure to satisfy this section shall not, for the purposes of §§ 48-18-301 to -303
or §§ 48-18-501 to -509, constitute an act or omission not in good faith, or a breach of the duty of
loyalty.” (emphasis added)).
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As a general matter, assuming a viable fiduciary duty claim, the
liability or financial responsibility of corporate directors for breaches of
fiduciary duty may be narrowed through the application of up to four
mandatory or permissive aspects of corporate law. These include
exculpation for breaches of the duty of care, indemnification (statutory and
privately ordered), director and officer liability insurance, and the possible
application of the business judgment rule in the judicial review process.92
Officers, as well as directors, may benefit from indemnification,
insurance, or the business judgment rule.93
These same protections are—or may be—available to directors and
officers in the benefit corporation context. Yet, where available, the
application of these protections to fiduciary duty litigation involving
managers of benefit corporations remains untested because benefit
corporation fiduciary duty litigation is, itself, untested. For example,
courts may reconsider whether, and if so when, to apply the business
judgment rule to review alleged breaches of duty arising under benefit
corporation law.94 Under applicable rules in some state benefit corporation
statutes, the board must consider the effects of its conduct on specific
constituencies as well as the corporation’s charter-based public benefit or
public benefits.95 This statutory requirement decreases the discretion
afforded to corporate management (by specifically defining what
management must consider) and limits the need for and reliance on
management expertise. Accordingly, statutory considerations may
undercut the rationale for, or decrease the need for, the business judgment
rule.96 To the extent that courts adopting the business judgment rule credit
management discretion and expertise in managing the firm as a rationale
92. See Todd M. Aman, Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Business Judgment Rule: A Critique in
Light of the Financial Meltdown, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1, 15 (2010–2011) (“[T]he vast majority of directors
receive protection from liability risk (through the business judgment rule, exculpation statutes,
insurance, indemnification, and so on).”); Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, Is There an
Emerging Fiduciary Duty to Consider Human Rights?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 75, 92 (2005) (“[T]he
combination of the business judgment rule, indemnification, insurance, and exculpation, . . . together
produce[s] . . . a low risk of personal liability.”).
93. There is some debate about the applicability of the business judgment rule to the decisions
and actions of corporate officers. See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate
Law: Business Judgment Rule, Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 414 (2013) (“[N]either
the doctrinal nor policy aspects of the business judgment rule have been settled with respect to
officers[.]”). This Article assumes for the sake of its argument that the rule may apply to officers.
94. The ill-understood and contested rationales for the business judgment rule may increase the
likelihood of a challenge to the rule in novel contexts. See, e.g., Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate
Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439, 454 (2005) (noting “deep-rooted
disagreement about the basic purpose and thrust of the business judgment rule” in addressing its
application to corporate officers).
95. See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text.
96. See generally Brownridge, supra note 88, at 727–30; Johnson, supra note 93, at 411–13
(noting the formulations and rationales for the business judgment rule).
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for use of the business judgment rule,97 why should a court give any credit
to directors or officers for complying with a statutory duty requiring them
to take specific constituencies and matters into consideration—a duty that
limits management discretion and the exercise of management expertise?
Moreover, if the business judgment rule does apply, we should expect that
the subsequent judicial assessment of a rational business purpose would
take into account the specific, express, chartered corporate purpose of the
firm.98
Difficult unanswered questions also exist in connection with benefit
corporation cash-out mergers and other conflicting interest transactions
that may invoke an entire fairness review of a transaction. In adjudicating
conflicting interest claims involving U.S. publicly held benefit
corporations, the judiciary has a chance to revisit the notions of fair dealing
(process) and fair price as components of entire fairness, as identified and
described under, for example, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.99 For instance, one
might ask how the statutorily required management considerations impact
(if at all) the notion or analysis of fair dealing. Moreover, benefit
corporation management and legal counsel will want to consider, in
moving forward with a transaction that could be subject to entire fairness
review, how the concept or evaluation of fair price may be affected by a
corporation’s public benefit or any related nonfinancial value that inures
to shareholders as a result of the transaction.
Additional doctrinal uncertainty may result from the application of
enhanced judicial review of board decision-making under Unocal100 and

97. See Johnson, supra note 93, at 412 (“Delaware courts frequently ground the rule in that
section of the corporate statute providing that the business and affairs of a corporation are to be
managed by or under the direction of its board.”).
98. The judicial conception of a rational business purpose in the general for-proft corporate
context is broad enough to encompass objectives other than shareholder wealth maximization as a
general matter. See Kevin V. Tu, Socially Conscious Corporations and Shareholder Profit, 84 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 121, 139 (2016) (“The application of the business judgment rule also shows that a
rational business purpose is not narrowly limited directly to the pursuit of shareholder profit in the
short term.”). Benefit corporation law expressly opens a whole new avenue for breadth in this area:
Benefit corporations open the door for irresponsible directors to justify their actions
(including self-interested actions) by pointing to some public benefit justification (or
alternatively when public benefit is involved, to some private shareholder benefit
justification). Managerial accountability has proven difficult in for-profit enterprises, and
it is difficult to conceptualize accountability in a hybrid entity with both broad general
public purposes and narrow private purposes.
J. William Callison, Putting New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed: How Benefit Corporations Address
Fiduciary Duties, the Dangers Created, and Suggestions for Change, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 85, 108
(2012) (footnote omitted).
99. 457 A.2d 701, 711–15 (Del. 1983).
100. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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Unitrin.101 Under Unocal’s first prong,102 for example, what is a “danger
to corporate policy and effectiveness”103 in the benefit corporation context
(which assumes the best interests of the corporation involve more than the
maximization of shareholder financial wealth)? What are “reasonable
grounds for belief”104 in that danger in this environment? The second
prong of Unocal105 also provides food for thought as applied to benefit
corporations. In particular, to the extent that existing judicial doctrine is
founded on shareholders with exclusive or primary interests in financial
wealth maximization, a court may construe coercion or the range of
reasonableness differently under Unitrin.106 Several commentators
provide useful information and preliminary insights on some of these
questions.107
Revlon108 duties, however, as originated in Delaware and applied in
a number of other states with benefit corporation statutes, present an even
clearer opportunity for a conflict between existing fiduciary duty doctrine
and benefit corporation law in a takeover defense environment. A number
of scholars and other pundits have already commented on the applicability
and relevance of Revlon to a benefit corporation’s decision to engage in
deal protection tactics.109 One commentator aptly summarizes the potential
for dissonance in a cogent paragraph:
Public benefit corporations . . . are, of course, novel ideas within the
realm of Delaware corporate law. In some instances, this novelty
clashes with the well-settled decisions of Delaware business courts,
most notably that of Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc., a 1986 decision issued by the Supreme Court of Delaware. In its
101. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
102. Under Unocal, the judicial review of director actions approving corporate defenses from an
unsolicited change in control is frequently said to have two prongs, the first of which requires directors
to prove a “danger to corporate policy or effectiveness”—a threat to the firm—and the second of which
requires directors to prove that the defensive action taken is proportional to the threat. See, e.g.,
Murray, Defending Patagonia, supra note 26, at 490–91; Bernard S. Sharfman, A Theory of
Shareholder Activism and its Place in Corporate Law, 82 TENN. L. REV. 791, 824–25 (2015); Robert
B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role: “Sacred Space”
in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 261, 282–83 (2001).
103. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 955–56.
106. See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1386–88 (defining and describing the role of coercion and the
range of reasonableness under Unocal).
107. See generally Sean W. Brownridge, A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Unocal and the Defensive
Mechanism Hidden in Corporate Benefit Purpose, 60 VILL. L. REV. 903 (2015). See also Murray,
Defending Patagonia, supra note 26, at 490–94.
108. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
109. See, e.g., Brownridge, supra note 88 (providing an analysis of the application of Revlon to
benefit corporations); Murray, Defending Patagonia, supra note 26, at 495–98 (describing “Revlonland” in the context of benefit corporations).
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most basic formulation, Revlon holds that “when a target board of
directors enters Revlon-land, the board’s role changes from that of
‘defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with
getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company.’
Less colloquially, Revlon-land is the space in which the duty of a
target corporation’s board shifts from corporate preservation to
maximization of the company’s value for the benefit of the
shareholders.110

The challenges to directors and officers, corporate legal advisors, and the
judiciary are palpable, and a showdown on the central questions relative
to the application of fiduciary duty doctrine in this context is seemingly
inevitable unless (and perhaps even if) legislatures directly address the
potential for conflict between the statutory duties of benefit corporation
management and judicially construed management fiduciary duties under
Revlon.111
However, U.S. benefit corporation statutes also provide new
protections to corporate management. Most prominently, they permit
limitations of director liability for disinterested breaches of duty by
authorizing charter provisions that customize the duty of loyalty to exclude
a disinterested failure to satisfy the applicable statutory standard of
conduct.112 In practical reality, absent the possibility that a specific,
separate cause of action may be brought asserting action or inaction
lacking in good faith,113 director liability for a breach of the duty of loyalty
would have to rest on a conflicting interest. State benefit corporation acts
also restrict potential claimants in an action against directors by providing
that directors do not owe duties to any beneficiaries of the corporation’s
public benefit purpose as a result of that beneficiary status.114 Thus,
although new director and officer fiduciary duties exist in the benefit
corporation context, liability for breach of these duties (and any resulting
in terrorem effect) has been statutorily limited.
These doctrinal issues are significant. But, they do not provide the
entire picture of fiduciary duty litigation risk. Litigation risk assessment
should take into account the nature of the cause of action in addition to the
substantive claim. Management breaches of fiduciary duty most
commonly are adjudicated in class actions or shareholder derivative
110. Brownridge, supra note 88, at 706 (footnotes omitted).
111. Accord id. at 749 (“[T]he Delaware legislature should clearly delineate how the interests in
Section 365(a) are to be balanced, and the Delaware business courts should carefully evaluate how
Revlon applies to public benefit corporation directors who find themselves in Revlon-land, so as to
articulate a standard, one way or the other, that brings clarity to the matter.”).
112. See generally supra note 91 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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actions.115 Despite some decisional law references to a fiduciary duty to
the corporation and its stockholders or shareholders, in most
decision-making contexts, the fiduciary duties of corporate management
are owed to the corporation and the corporation is entitled to any relief
awarded.116 The cases brought in connection with mergers and acquisitions
are a large exception, typically generating class action litigation rather than
shareholder derivative litigation.117
Although the process of class action litigation is untouched by
benefit corporation law, under some state benefit corporation statutes,
derivative actions for breach of the statutorily mandated fiduciary duties
are expressly contemplated and addressed. Delaware’s benefit corporation
law, for example, provides that:
Stockholders of a public benefit corporation owning individually or
collectively, as of the date of instituting such derivative suit, at least
2% of the corporation’s outstanding shares or, in the case of a
corporation with shares listed on a national securities exchange, the
lesser of such percentage or shares of at least $2,000,000 in market
value, may maintain a derivative lawsuit to enforce the requirements
set forth in § 365(a) of this title.118

The benefit corporation statutes in Colorado and Tennessee include a
substantially similar provision.119
By affording a right of action only to derivative plaintiffs having a
requisite percentage or dollar value of shareholdings, benefit corporation
laws may decrease the prospect of fiduciary duty enforcement litigation.
Although the 2% threshold level of ownership for derivative actions under
the Colorado, Delaware, and Tennessee statutes is lower than the standard
5% test for benefit enforcement actions,120 2% still is a high threshold of
ownership for shareholder rights in a publicly held corporation. Even a 1%
threshold seems high in the public company context.121 Retail investors

115. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative
Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1762 (2004).
116. See David J. Beck, The Legal Profession at the Crossroads: Who Will Write the Future
Rules Governing the Conduct of Lawyers Representing Public Corporations?, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J.
873, 889 (2003) (“A corporation’s shareholders ordinarily cannot bring an individual suit to recover
for a wrong committed solely against the corporation, even if the shareholders also suffer damages as
a result of the wrong. . . .”).
117. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 115, at 1762.
118. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 367 (2013).
119. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-101-508 (West 2014); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-28-108 (2016).
120. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
121. Contra Patty M. DeGaetano, The Shareholder Direct Access Teeter-Totter: Will Increased
Shareholder Voice in the Director Nomination Process Protect Investors?, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 361,
413 (2005) (“The one percent threshold to place a shareholder access proposal on the ballot is too low.
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would be highly unlikely to own that high a threshold of ownership in a
public company, although institutional investors (which typically are less
likely to bring legal actions against the firms in which they invest) may
cross a 1% or 2% level of public company ownership.122 The composition
of equity investors in publicly held benefit corporations is a matter about
which much speculation exists. Institutional investors may or may not play
a significant role in this sector of the market for publicly traded securities
once it emerges. Moreover, an observer’s view on the perceived
appropriateness of a required level of ownership for the exercise of a
shareholder right depends on the observer’s assessment of the costs and
benefits associated with that shareholder right. It is important to note in
this context the existence of an alternative market value test for
corporations with exchange-traded securities.123 In a firm with a high
market capitalization or per-share values, it may be easier, but still not
easy, for a disgruntled shareholder to qualify under this market value test.
In addition, under benefit corporation laws that provide for benefit
enforcement proceedings,124 legal actions for a failure to comply with the
benefit corporation standards of conduct for directors are expressly
foreclosed. Shareholders are relegated to using a benefit enforcement
proceeding to advance these kinds of claims in court.125 This cause of
action is legislatively constructed and unique to benefit corporations.126
Putative shareholder plaintiffs also must qualify with a threshold level of
ownership of shares in the corporation in order to bring suit.127
Thus, judicial accountability tools are relatively weak, and limits on
management liability for fiduciary duty breaches in state benefit
corporation statutes are relatively strong. In states where they are
This would allow, in essence, ‘the tail to wag the dog,’ because only one of a company’s shareholders
would be able to set a costly and time-consuming process in motion.”).
122. See, e.g., id. at 396 n.209 (“[O]f publicly traded companies, the SEC estimated that 84%
have at least one institutional shareholder that has maintained ownership of at least 1% of the shares
outstanding for one year. Even so, submission of security holder proposals by large holders is rare,
based on a review of a sample of 237 security holder proposals in 2002, where only three were found
to have been submitted by a holder of more than 1% of the shares outstanding, and all three of those
were submitted by the same security holder.” (citations omitted)); Alicia Davis Evans, The Investor
Compensation Fund, 33 J. CORP. L. 223, 246 (2007) (“Because it is unlikely that any one retail investor
will hold a 1% stake in a public company, generally institutions will be the only stockholders with the
independent power (i.e., not as a part of a group) to initiate proceedings. The managers of such
institutions, as sophisticated businesspeople, are unlikely to file charges that lack merit.”).
123. See, e.g., supra note 118 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-1362(a) (2014) (“Except in a benefit enforcement
proceeding, no person may bring an action or assert a claim against a benefit corporation or its directors
or officers with respect to . . . the violation of an obligation, duty or standard of conduct under sections
33-1352 to 33-1364, inclusive.”).
126. See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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available, shareholder derivative actions are constrained to classes of
plaintiffs based on the percentage or market value of their ownership
interests. Shareholder access to benefit enforcement proceedings is
similarly restricted.128 When layered onto the liability protections that
benefit corporation management may have available, the regulation of
causes of action in the benefit corporation context complete an overall
picture of limited accountability.
B. Federal Securities Fraud and Misstatement Claims
Benefit corporation law does not address federal securities law
engagement or compliance, except indirectly (e.g., by reference to benefit
corporations having exchange-traded shares129). This is unsurprising
because the statutory and regulatory schemes have different objectives.
The focus of securities regulation is not to protect corporate purpose or the
best interest of the firm; rather, securities regulation protects investors,
markets, and capital raising generally.130 Yet, for benefit corporations to
survive, they must engage in financing activities, and some of those
involve the sale and purchase of financial instruments recognized as
securities.
Publicly traded benefit corporations, like other public companies,
will be actively regulated under both legal regimes.131 Most aspects of
securities regulation (and the accompanying potential for litigation) should
be the same for both general for-profit corporations and benefit
corporations. However, the risk of specific types of securities fraud claims
against U.S. public benefit corporations may be anticipated.
128. See supra notes 118–127 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, What is a Security in the Crowdfunding Era?, 7 OHIO
ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 335, 337 (2012) (“Although variously stated, the key policies
underlying U.S. securities regulation are the protection of investors and the maintenance of the
integrity of the national securities markets, with the overall objective of enhancing prospects for capital
formation to sustain business activity and growth.”); Meeka Jun, New Capital Markets and Securities
Regulations in Hungary: A Comparative Analysis of the Insider Trading Regulations in Hungary and
the United States, 19 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1047, 1067–68 (1993) (“The stated policy of the securities
regulations is to foster capital flow, to promote securities markets, and to safeguard investors.”);
Constance Z. Wagner, Securities Fraud in Cyberspace: Reaching the Outer Limits of the Federal
Securities Laws, 80 NEB. L. REV. 920, 928–29 (2001) (describing these policies as “protection of
investors, ensuring that markets are fair, efficient, and transparent, and reducing systemic risk”).
131. See, e.g., Christopher M. Bruner, Managing Corporate Federalism: The Least-Bad
Approach to the Shareholder Bylaw Debate, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 26 (2011) (“A typical public
company in the United States will find itself regulated by corporate law made in Delaware and
securities regulation made by Congress and the SEC.”); James J. Park, Two Trends in the Regulation
of the Public Corporation, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 429, 432–34 (2012) (describing
how securities law and state corporate law, as well as securities exchanges, regulate public company
governance).
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Securities fraud claims often are based on misstatements of material
fact or omissions of material fact that make existing statements
misleading.132 The most well-known bases for this particular cause of
action are Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act (Section 10(b))133 and
Rule 10b-5 adopted by the SEC under Section 10(b) (Rule 10b-5).134
Accordingly, this Article focuses its securities regulation litigation risk
analysis on the substantive doctrine under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
However, it should be acknowledged that securities fraud and
misstatement liability are also cognizable under state law and elsewhere
under federal securities law as a component of public offering
regulation,135 proxy regulation,136 tender offer regulation,137 and
going-private regulation.138 The elements of these fraud and misstatement
claims are different (including because, e.g., some claims—including
those under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5—require proof of scienter and
some do not), and the relief that may be sought (damages, rescission, etc.)
varies.139 Nevertheless, the prominence of Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5
litigation makes it a useful example.
Successful securities fraud actions brought under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 require proof by the plaintiff of three core elements
constituting wrongful conduct, regardless of whether enforcement is
public or private. To violate Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a defendant’s
actions must be (1) deceptive or manipulative (including by misstating a
material fact or omitting to state a material fact necessary to make
disclosed information not misleading), (2) in connection with the purchase
or sale of a security, and (3) taken with the requisite scienter.140 Proof of
132. See, e.g., Patrick M. Garry et al., The Irrationality of Shareholder Class Action Lawsuits:
A Proposal for Reform, 49 S.D. L. REV. 275, 302 (2003–2004) (“The vast majority of securities fraud
complaints refer to misstatements made by management ‘in the regular course of business,’ including
press releases, conversations with the media, voluntary disclosures in public speeches, and
government-required reports.”); Billy Kloos et al., Securities Fraud, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 921, 924
(2006) (“Material misrepresentations and omissions give rise to the most common securities fraud
actions.”).
133. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).
134. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016).
135. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77l, 77m(a)(2), 77q.
136. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9.
137. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e).
138. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3.
139. See, e.g., Edward A. Fallone, Crowdfunding and Sport: How Soon Until the Fans Own the
Franchise?, 25 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 7, 19 (2014) (“The elements of a cause of action for securities
fraud differ slightly from the elements of a common law fraud claim.”).
140. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Monarch Funding Corp., 192 F.3d 295, 308 (2d Cir. 1999) (“To have
violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5, . . . [the defendant] must have: (1) made a material
misrepresentation or a material omission as to which he had a duty to speak, or used a fraudulent
device; (2) with scienter; (3) in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.” (citation omitted));
S.E.C. v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1467 (2d Cir. 1996) (“In order to establish primary
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additional elements is required both for a successful criminal securities
fraud action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 (including willful
conduct), which must meet the higher “beyond a reasonable doubt”
standard of evidence for criminal actions,141 and for a successful private
civil action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 (including reliance, a loss,
and loss causation).142
Why might legal action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 be a
notable litigation risk for publicly traded benefit corporations? Private
plaintiffs may bring legal actions under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for
alleged misstatements of material fact relating to the defendant firm’s
business. Most often, these cases are brought as class actions.143 A recent
example of this genre of securities fraud action is In re Lululemon
Securities Litigation, a case centering on a false and misleading statement
about the quality of yoga pants sold by lululemon athletica inc.144
Although the Lululemon case was dismissed (based on the plaintiffs’
failure to plead that the alleged statements were either false or misleading
in any material respect) and that dismissal was affirmed on appeal, the risk
of suit alone—as well the possibility of success, or even survival of a
motion to dismiss—in some cases is itself a litigation risk.
liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5, a plaintiff is required to prove that in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security the defendant, acting with scienter, made a material misrepresentation
(or a material omission if the defendant had a duty to speak) or used a fraudulent device.”).
141. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2012) (requiring willful, or in the case of a false or misleading
statement in an application, report, or document, willful and knowing conduct); see also United States
v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 665 (1997) (“To establish a criminal violation of Rule 10b–5, the
Government must prove that a person ‘willfully’ violated the provision.”).
142. See, e.g., In re Int’l Bus. Machines Corp. Sec. Litig., 163 F.3d 102, 106 (2d Cir. 1998)
(“To state a cause of action under Section 10(b) or Rule 10b–5 plaintiffs must prove that IBM (1)
made misstatements or omissions of material fact; (2) with scienter; (3) in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities; (4) upon which plaintiffs relied; and (5) that plaintiffs’ reliance was the
proximate cause of their injury.”); Bloor v. Carro, Spanbock, Londin, Rodman & Fass, 754 F.2d 57,
61 (2d Cir. 1985) (“In order to state a claim for relief under section 10(b) a plaintiff must allege that,
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, the defendant, acting with scienter, made a false
material representation or omitted to disclose material information and that plaintiff’s reliance on
defendant’s actions caused him injury.”).
143. See, e.g., Mark K. Harder, Getting the Federal Securities Fraud Laws Moving Again After
Chiarella and Dirks: A Proposal for Reform, 10 J. CORP. L. 711, 728 n.185 (1985) (“Rule 10b-5 actions
are commonly time consuming, complex, and often class actions.”).
144. 14 F. Supp. 3d 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d, 604 F. App’x 62 (2d Cir. 2015). The trial court
adequately summarized the allegations in the complaint in this short paragraph:
Boiled down to a summary version, lead plaintiff alleges that if only lululemon had
someone try on its black luon yoga pants before they shipped, it would have realized they
were sheer; similarly, if lululemon had only had someone exercise in certain athletic wear
(enough to produce sweat), it would have realized that the colors bled. As a result, lead
plaintiff alleges that defendants’ various statements referencing, inter alia, the high quality
of lululemon’s products and the steps the company took to fix the quality issues were
materially false or misleading.
Id. at 562.
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Litigation of this kind seems likely to strike publicly held benefit
corporations because of the inherent difficulty the firm and its advisors
have in accurately and completely conveying the relationship between or
among the beneficiaries of a benefit corporation’s general or specific
public benefit corporate purpose. Public commentary on the initial filing
for the Laureate Education, Inc. initial public offering addresses this issue:
[I]n a public benefit corporation, the benefit can be hard to define.
That appears to be true in the case of Laureate. I’m not particularly
sure what creating a “positive effect” through “offering diverse
education programs” actually means.
Given the vagueness here, instead of being a force for good,
Laureate’s benefit may simply result in greenwashing, that is, use of
a public-relations-enhancing social purpose to fritter away money
without oversight. To be sure, a Delaware-based public benefit
corporation is required to be audited every two years for compliance
with its objective, and Laureate has picked B Corp as its auditor. Still,
given the newness of this form, it is uncertain how rigorous this
auditing is, or even can be, given the loose benefit here.
This vagueness might be fine in a private company with only a few
owners who can do whatever they want with their company—like
paying Bill Clinton millions—but Laureate will be public, with
thousands of shareholders.145

Because the public benefit is so central to the existence and
operations of a benefit corporation, both consumers and investors will rely
on the public disclosures of and about it. 146 From the investor standpoint,
disclosures on and connected to a benefit corporation’s public purpose will
be used to price securities in what will be a new sector of the public
securities markets. Pricing inaccuracies spark investor dissatisfaction,
which may lead to allegations of materially false or misleading
disclosures. Notwithstanding the likely protections of a watchdog
marketplace,147 the risk of litigation over inaccuracies and
misunderstandings is salient.
A potentially significant legal digression on the extent of this
litigation risk involves the loss causation element in private legal action.148
145. Steven Davidoff Solomon, Idealism That May Leave Shareholders Wishing for
Pragmatism, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/14/
business/dealbook/laureate-education-for-profit-school-public-benefit.html?_r=0.
146. See Michelle J. Stecker, Awash in a Sea of Confusion: Benefit Corporations, Social
Enterprise, and the Fear of “Greenwashing,” 50 J. ECON. ISSUES 373, 378 (2016) (“The fear of
corporate greenwashing is a valid concern for socially conscious consumers and investors.”).
147. See id. at 378–79.
148. See generally Robert N. Rapp, Plausible Cause: Exploring the Limits of Loss Causation in
Pleading and Proving Market Fraud Claims Under Securities Exchange Act §10(b) and SEC Rule
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If a shareholder’s Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claim against a benefit
corporation relates to the corporation’s underdisclosure of the weight it
gives to shareholder financial wealth maximization in a particular context
and the directors’ actions favoring shareholder financial wealth lead to
higher prices for the defendant’s shares in the market, the shareholder may
have a difficult time alleging and proving a loss and, therefore, loss
causation. One legal commentator argues that this risk may be inherent in
the benefit corporation structure:
[I]t is arguable that . . . the directors of a benefit corporation will
follow the power—they are elected by shareholders—and will
ultimately serve the private interests of the shareholders rather than
some broad social good. When faced with a conflict between
shareholder interests and social goods, directors will likely align with
the shareholders, since only the shareholders vote for directors.149

Public enforcement of a price-enhancing disclosure lapse would still exist
on these facts, lest there be a concern that the lack of loss causation
prevents enforcement action from being taken against the corporation
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Moreover, a creative trial lawyer may
find another way for a private civil plaintiff to remedy damages resulting
from inaccurate disclosures.
Loss causation issues notwithstanding, the difficulty in managing
disclosures and investor expectations in publicly held U.S. benefit
corporations seem likely to generate securities fraud and misstatement
cases, including individual and class actions brought under Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5. An additional factor to consider in this context is the very
public nature of publicly held benefit corporations and the spotlight likely
to be focused on early adopters. Professor Hillary Sale’s work on
“publicness”150 informs this aspect of the publicly held benefit
corporation: “As corporations grow, the groups grow and so do their
responsibilities. When they choose to become public corporations, they
become subject to multiple regimes. Then, when scandals occur, public
focus on what they are doing and the corporate governance system
grows.”151

10b-5, 41 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 389 (2015) (focusing on the loss causation element in Section 10(b)/Rule
10b-5 actions).
149. Callison, supra note 98, at 109.
150. See Hillary A. Sale, J.P. Morgan: An Anatomy of Corporate Publicness, 79 BROOK. L. REV.
1629 (2014); Hillary A. Sale, Public Governance, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1012 (2013); Hillary A.
Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 141 (2011) [hereinafter Sale,
New “Public” Corporation].
151. Sale, New “Public” Corporation, supra note 150, at 141.
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The Internet, the blogosphere, and other factors in contemporary
business life, when layered onto public company disclosure regulation,
make public company activities easier to notice and follow. Every word of
every public statement—including those on websites and in product
promotions, as well as those in public filings—can easily be captured and
analyzed by unhappy investors desiring to remedy losses through
litigation.152 Benefit corporations in the public markets, like a shiny new
penny, are likely to get special notice and, as a result, be subject to
enhanced scrutiny. This attention may also increase the risk of securities
fraud and misstatement litigation.
III. WHAT USEFUL INFORMATION CAN WE DERIVE FROM THE EXPECTED
UNIQUE LITIGATION RISKS ATTENDANT TO BEING A PUBLICLY HELD
U.S. BENEFIT CORPORATION?
The foregoing summary of the unique attributes of benefit
corporations and distinctive aspects of the litigation risks they may bear as
public companies highlights a number of governance, regulatory, and
public and private enforcement issues. This Part is designed to identify and
describe those issues. A common thread unites these observations:
corporate purpose.
In the benefit corporation form, the articulated corporate purpose—
a benefit purpose—plays a dominant role. The benefit purpose is identified
in the corporation’s charter and is the focus of firm management in
operating the firm’s business and informing others about the firm and its
operations. The possibility of liability (for the firm and the individuals who
manage it) necessarily becomes a concern in planning for and operating
the benefit corporation’s business. Sensitivity to these concerns is
heightened for publicly held benefit corporations.
Novel managerial obligations and fiduciary duties in the benefit
corporation form build upon, leverage, and complement the corporation’s
benefit purpose. Benefit corporation directors and officers are required to
conduct their corporate activities in a statutorily mandated environment
that affords them challengingly constrained, vague, and multifaceted
discretion to manage the firm. In this difficult organizational setting,
however, the managers of the benefit corporation are well protected from
liability for failing to fully comply with the governance rules applicable to
their conduct:
Benefit corporations are not only required to have the purpose of
creating “general public benefit,” but they can be held accountable
152. See generally id. at 137 (“[A]s reporting requirements grow and technology increases,
information becomes more accessible, digestible, and analyzable.”).
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by shareholders should they become derelict in that duty. In turn, the
directors and officers of benefit corporations are legally protected
when they consider decisions based on the interests beyond those of
just their shareholders. Voluntarily undertaking these duties and
obligations by becoming a benefit corporation truly embeds them in
the institution, acting as a safeguard against any potential slackening
of commitment over time.153

Overall, the benefit corporation structure places pressure on the
intersection between the corporation’s benefit purpose and managerial
conduct.
This structural pressure on officers and directors is not accompanied
by meaningful state law accountability mechanisms for enforcing these
new, distinctive management norms. Traditional state law protections for
corporate managers are available to benefit corporation directors and
officers, and these protections have been expanded under benefit
corporation law—although perhaps not perfectly—to cover the new risks
attendant to managing a benefit corporation.154 One could conclude that
benefit corporation law provides little assurance that directors and officers
will not defect or shirk.155
Yet, as is true in the regulation of corporate management generally,
market forces also are likely to play a role in assuring that benefit
corporation directors and officers hew to the firm’s benefit purpose and
act in accordance with their fiduciary duties:
Corporate directors operate within a pervasive web of accountability
mechanisms that substitute for monitoring by residual claimants. A
variety of market forces provide important constraints. The capital
and product markets, the internal and external employment markets,
and the market for corporate control all constrain shirking by firm
agents.156

The extent to which market forces may play a role in managing the
managers of benefit corporations depends on the health, efficiency, and
maturity of the markets in which the firm participates. Undoubtedly,
153. Shelley Alpern, When B Corp Met Wall Street, CLEAN YIELD ASSET MGMT. (Mar. 18,
2015), http://www.cleanyield.com/when-b-corp-met-wall-street [https://perma.cc/J7LU-TRMR].
154. See supra notes 112–114 and accompanying text (describing new protections available
under benefit corporation statutes).
155. See generally Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (or, Why You
Don’t Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2003) (“Directors
frequently hold only small stakes in the companies they manage. Moreover, a variety of legal rules
and contractual arrangements insulate them from liability for business failures. Why then should we
expect them to do a good job?”).
156. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 769, 785 (2006).
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publicly held benefit corporations will participate in markets that will
provide helpful norms and discipline. However, owing to the central
nature of corporate purpose in benefit corporations, they occupy a new,
unique place in the market for business entities and will be a novel piece
of the for-profit corporate public investment market. The ability of the
market to discipline and correct managerial wrongdoing in publicly held
benefit corporations is untested.
Accordingly, it is difficult to tell whether benefit corporation law has
struck the right balance between the board’s authority (in terms of its
obligations and duties) and its accountability. Perhaps only time will tell.
As one observer concluded, “Ultimately, the shareholders and others who
are relying on the requirements of . . . any benefit corporation act must rely
on the integrity of the board of directors—as must the shareholders of all
corporations.”157
This reliance is undoubtedly more comfortable for small-firm
investors and shareholders, who are likely to know each other and the
corporate managers better and be able to monitor the corporate managers
more closely. In the public firm setting, however, these close relationships
do not typically exist. Other than shareholder litigation, the main way in
which shareholders hold public company directors accountable is by
failing to reelect them—no small task:
The right to elect the company’s board of directors is the primary
control that shareholders have in furthering a material public benefit.
This is not a novel provision unique to benefit corporation legislation;
it is standard for traditional corporations. Shareholders are able to
elect the directors they feel are best able to pursue a socially
beneficial policy, which experts argue represents shareholders’ main
means of controlling a benefit corporation. However, this right is of
limited practical effect in providing a company’s stakeholders with
the capability to hold directors accountable in the course of their
duties.158

Thus, shareholder voting power in director elections is a real, but
likely weak, accountability tool. Its weakness may be more pronounced in
the publicly held benefit corporation context to the extent that there is
disagreement in the shareholder base on how to properly balance the
various focal points of the corporation’s chartered public benefit. The
commonly dispersed, disaggregated shareholdings of public companies
may increase the likelihood of disagreement about the way in which the

157. Herrick K. Lidstone, Jr., The Long and Winding Road to Public Benefit Corporations in
Colorado, COLO. LAW., Jan. 2014, at 39, 44.
158. Nass, supra note 67, at 886 (footnotes omitted).
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board of directors must or should weigh the various interests and
constituencies the corporation serves in its deliberations.
As played out in the public realm, the uncertain governance
environment for U.S. benefit corporations may beg for more than
shareholder enforcement mechanisms. Additional regulation at the state or
federal level also may play a role:
Governance is not just about relationships between officers,
directors, and shareholders. Public companies operate in a public
sphere, making public disclosures on a regular basis. The SEC
dictates what, when, why, and how much they must say. Corporations
are also subject to media and blogging. So is the SEC. These factors
combine to increase expectations about the SEC’s role and pressure
for the SEC to do something when things go wrong. That pressure
shifts to corporations, their public disclosures, and their governance
choices.159

This cyclical relationship between the governed and the government will
continue to evolve the rules and norms for all publicly held firms,
including publicly held benefit corporations. This evolution is likely to
occur both through traditional legislative and regulatory enactments and
through selective public enforcement.
In fact, the same factors that may catalyze government intervention
in publicly held U.S. benefit corporations contribute to the overall risk of
litigation against these firms. Public disclosure mandates and overall
“publicness,” when layered onto doctrinal uncertainties in benefit
corporation law, may resurrect—in a new context—debates waged in past
judicial opinions relating to for-profit corporations generally. As the
analysis in Part II indicates, these debates may include (among other
things): the nature of a viable claim that corporate action is ultra vires and
the extent to which that claim can be pursued;160 the classification of good
faith claims against directors or officers as a matter of fiduciary duty
analysis under Delaware law and the laws of other states;161 the
applicability of the business judgment rule in the judicial review of
decisions made and actions taken by benefit corporation directors and
officers;162 the application of entire fairness judicial review and other
forms of enhanced judicial scrutiny (including over antitakeover measures
adopted by benefit corporations’ boards of directors);163 shareholder
standing to bring derivative litigation against benefit corporation directors
159. Sale, New “Public” Corporation, supra note 150, at 144.
160. See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 99–111 and accompanying text.
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or officers;164 and the elements of a misstatement or omission claim under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.165
Moreover, benefit corporation law brings with it new doctrine that
will be independently scrutinized in the wake of shareholder or investor
dissatisfaction. Benefit corporation incorporation (including, crucially, the
required corporate purpose clauses) and benefit report filings, benefit
enforcement proceedings, and other novel aspects of benefit corporation
law not addressed in this Article invite, and are likely to require, judicial
interpretation (and possible legislative adjustment). For example, given
that even a limited review of incorporation filings reveals a number of
erroneous filings166 and that compliance with benefit report filing
requirements similarly appears to be wanting,167 enforcement action may
be anticipated. One also might anticipate litigation battles over the
availability of benefit enforcement proceedings.168
The distinctive features of the benefit corporation form, taken
together with key attendant litigation risks for publicly held U.S. benefit
corporations identified in this Article, confirm and underscore the key role
that corporate purpose plays in benefit corporation law. A benefit
corporation’s corporate purpose underlies in some way each of the traits
and risks identified. Undoubtedly, observations beyond those included
here can be made on the governance, regulatory, and enforcement issues
involving publicly held U.S. benefit corporations. Even if additional
observations are made, however, the central position of the benefit purpose
is likely to loom large.
The information, analysis, and observations supplied in this Article
have salience for government officials, policymakers, benefit corporation
management, legal advisors of corporations, and academic observers,
among others. Specifically, reflections on the substance of this Article
may:
 help secretaries of state identify, and instigate them to address,
compliance problems in benefit corporation filings, especially in
charter documents;
 inspire promoters of benefit corporation legislation, members of
the corporate bar, and legislators to inquire deeply into the
existing state law relating to ultra vires actions and director and
officer fiduciary duties before recommending the adoption of
benefit corporation legislation in that state;
164. See supra notes 118–118 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 148–144 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 12 & 14 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 46.
168. See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text.
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increase the attention of drafters of model benefit corporation
legislation and individual state benefit corporation statutes to,
among other things, the formulation of the statutory public
benefit requirement, exculpation authorization, and requirements
for and restrictions on private enforcement actions (e.g., benefit
enforcement proceedings and shareholder derivative litigation);
prompt state legislators and members of the corporate bar to
review existing benefit corporation statutes on a regular basis
and suggest changes that decrease doctrinal uncertainty and
increase predictability in interpretation and application;
encourage directors and officers of benefit corporations to work
with corporate counsel to create checklists for routine
management and common transactional decision-making that
incorporate focused, state-of-the-art legal analysis and evolving
best practices borrowed from analogous areas of for-profit and
not-for-profit corporate law;
offer new considerations and perspectives to benefit corporation
management and legal counsel relevant to the choice of whether
to take a benefit corporation public;
enhance the attentiveness of benefit corporation directors,
officers, and legal counsel to the accuracy and completeness of
public disclosures (especially to avoid overclaiming or otherwise
misrepresenting the firm’s public benefit purpose); and
stimulate additional research into unsettled questions under
corporate or securities law addressed or referenced in the
preceding pages or otherwise relevant to benefit corporations.

If this Article causes any of these things to occur as the prospect of publicly
held benefit corporations becomes increasingly likely—or even if the
Article merely prompts additional questions about corporate purpose that
various constituencies may ask—it will have succeeded in its mission.
CONCLUSION
Benefit corporations may or may not be a necessary or desirable tool
in the U.S. entity law toolbox. Regardless, benefit corporation legislation
has been widely adopted, businesses are incorporating under those
legislative enactments, and a few among the resultant benefit corporations
are poised to enter the public securities markets. As a result, it is important
to better understand the unique attributes of benefit corporation law as a
component of corporate law and to begin to anticipate the associated
litigation risk publicly held U.S. benefit corporations may face. This
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Article undertakes to make progress in addressing these objectives with
the hope that subsequent work will further engage them.
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APPENDIX 1: SUMMARY OF PUBLIC BENEFIT PROVISIONS IN STATE
BENEFIT CORPORATION STATUTES (CURRENT AS OF MARCH 2016)
State

General Benefit
Required
X
X
X

Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
X
Delaware
Florida
X
Hawaii
X
Idaho
X
Illinois
X
Indiana
X
Louisiana
X
Maryland
X
Massachusetts
X
Minnesota
Xb
Montana
X
Nebraska
X
Nevada
X
New Hampshire
X
New Jersey
X
New York
X
Oregon
X
Pennsylvania
X
Rhode Island
X
South Carolina
X
Tennessee
Xd
Utah
X
Vermont
X
Virginia
X
West Virginia
X
Washington, D.C.
X
a at least one
b if incorporated as a general benefit
corporation

Specific Benefit
Required

Specific Benefit
Optional
X
X
X

Xa
X
X

a

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Xc
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
c if incorporated as a specific benefit
corporation
d at least one public benefit required
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APPENDIX 2: PUBLIC BENEFIT DEFINITIONS IN STATE BENEFIT
CORPORATION STATUTES (CURRENT AS OF MARCH 2016)
State and
Statutory
Reference

General Public Benefit
Definition

Specific Public Benefit
Definition

Arizona

“General public benefit”
means a material positive
impact on society and the
environment, taken as a
whole, assessed against a
third-party standard, from
the business and operations
of a benefit corporation.

“Specific public benefit”
includes:
(a) Providing low-income
or underserved individuals
or communities with
beneficial products or
services.
(b) Promoting economic
opportunity for individuals
or communities beyond the
creation of jobs in the
normal course of business.
(c) Protecting or restoring
the environment.
(d) Improving human
health.
(e) Promoting the arts,
sciences or advancement of
knowledge.
(f) Increasing the flow of
capital to entities with a
purpose to benefit society
or the environment.
(g) Conferring any other
particular benefit on
society or the environment
as specified in the benefit
corporation's articles of
incorporation.

ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 10-2402
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State and
Statutory
Reference

General Public Benefit
Definition

Specific Public Benefit
Definition

Arkansas

“General public benefit”
means a material positive
impact on society and the
environment, taken as a
whole, assessed against a
third-party standard, from
the business and operations
of a benefit corporation;

“Specific public benefit”
means:
(A) Providing low-income
or underserved individuals
or communities with
beneficial products or
services;
(B) Promoting economic
opportunity for individuals
or communities beyond the
creation of jobs in the
normal course of business;
(C) Preserving the
environment;
(D) Improving human
health;
(E) Promoting the arts,
sciences, or advancement
of knowledge;
(F) Increasing the flow of
capital to entities with a
public benefit purpose; and
(G) Conferring any other
particular benefit on
society or the environment.

ARK. CODE § 436-103

2017]

Corporate Purpose and Litigation Risk

655

State and
Statutory
Reference

General Public Benefit
Definition

Specific Public Benefit
Definition

California

“General public benefit”
means a material positive
impact on society and the
environment, taken as a
whole, as assessed against
a third-party standard, from
the business and operations
of a benefit corporation.

“Specific public benefit”
includes all of the
following:
(1) Providing low-income
or underserved individuals
or communities with
beneficial products or
services.
(2) Promoting economic
opportunity for individuals
or communities beyond the
creation of jobs in the
ordinary course of
business.
(3) Preserving the
environment.
(4) Improving human
health.
(5) Promoting the arts,
sciences, or advancement
of knowledge.
(6) Increasing the flow of
capital to entities with a
public benefit purpose.
(7) The accomplishment of
any other particular benefit
for society or the
environment.

CAL. CORP.
CODE § 14601
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State and
Statutory
Reference

General Public Benefit
Definition

Colorado

“Public benefit” means one
or more positive effects or
reduction of negative
effects on one or more
categories of persons,
entities, communities, or
interests other than
shareholders in their
capacities as shareholders,
including effects of an
artistic, charitable, cultural,
economic, educational,
environmental, literary,
medical, religious,
scientific, or technological
nature.

COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 7101-503
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Specific Public Benefit
Definition
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State and
Statutory
Reference

General Public Benefit
Definition

Specific Public Benefit
Definition

Connecticut

“General public benefit”
means a material positive
impact on both society and
the environment, taken as a
whole, as assessed against
a third-party standard, from
the business and operations
of a benefit corporation.

“Specific public benefit”
includes:
(A) Providing low-income
or underserved individuals
or communities with
beneficial products or
services;
(B) promoting economic
opportunity for individuals
or communities beyond the
creation of jobs in the
normal course of business;
(C) protecting or restoring
the environment;
(D) improving human
health;
(E) promoting the arts,
sciences or advancement of
knowledge;
(F) increasing the flow of
capital to other benefit
corporations or similar
entities whose purpose is to
benefit society or the
environment; and
(G) conferring any other
particular benefit on
society or the environment.

CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §
33-1351
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State and
Statutory
Reference

General Public Benefit
Definition

Delaware

“Public benefit” means a
positive effect (or
reduction of negative
effects) on 1 or more
categories of persons,
entities, communities or
interests (other than
stockholders in their
capacities as stockholders)
including, but not limited
to, effects of an artistic,
charitable, cultural,
economic, educational,
environmental, literary,
medical, religious,
scientific or technological
nature.

DEL. CODE ANN.
8, § 362

TIT.
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Specific Public Benefit
Definition
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State and
Statutory
Reference

General Public Benefit
Definition

Specific Public Benefit
Definition

Florida

“General public benefit”
means a material, positive
effect on society and the
environment, taken as a
whole, as assessed using a
third-party standard which
is attributable to the
business and operations of
a benefit corporation.

“Specific public benefit”
includes, but is not limited
to:
(a) Providing low-income
or underserved individuals
or communities with
beneficial products or
services;
(b) Promoting economic
opportunity for individuals
or communities beyond the
creation of jobs in the
normal course of business;
(c) Protecting or restoring
the environment;
(d) Improving human
health;
(e) Promoting the arts,
sciences, or advancement
of knowledge;
(f) Increasing the flow of
capital to entities that have
as their stated purpose the
provision of a benefit to
society or the environment;
and
(g) Any other public
benefit consistent with the
purposes of the benefit
corporation.

FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 607.602
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Statutory
Reference

General Public Benefit
Definition

Hawaii

“General public benefit”
means a material positive
impact on society and the
environment, taken as a
whole and as measured by
a third-party standard
under section 420D-12,
from the business and
operations of a sustainable
business corporation.

HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. §
420D-2

Idaho
IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 30-2002

“General public benefit”
means a material positive
impact on society and the
environment, taken as a
whole, as assessed under a
third-party standard,
resulting from the business
and operations of a benefit
corporation.

[Vol. 40:611

Specific Public Benefit
Definition

“Specific public benefit”
includes:
(a) Providing low-income
or underserved individuals
or communities with
beneficial products or
services;
(b) Promoting economic
opportunity for individuals
or communities beyond the
creation of jobs in the
normal course of business;
(c) Protecting or restoring
the environment;
(d) Improving human
health;
(e) Promoting the arts,
sciences or advancement of
knowledge;
(f) Increasing the flow of
capital to entities with a
purpose to benefit society
or the environment; or
(g) Conferring any other
particular benefit on
society or the environment.
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State and
Statutory
Reference

General Public Benefit
Definition

Specific Public Benefit
Definition

Illinois

“General public benefit”
means a material positive
impact on society and the
environment, taken as a
whole, assessed against a
third-party standard, from
the business and operations
of a benefit corporation.

“Specific public benefit”
means:
(1) providing low-income
or underserved individuals
or communities with
beneficial products or
services;
(2) promoting economic
opportunity for individuals
or communities beyond the
creation of jobs in the
ordinary course of
business;
(3) preserving the
environment;
(4) improving human
health;
(5) promoting the arts,
sciences or advancement of
knowledge;
(6) increasing the flow of
capital to entities with a
public benefit purpose; or
(7) the accomplishment of
any other particular benefit
for society or the
environment.

805 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN.
40/1.10
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Indiana
IND. CODE ANN.
§ 23-1.3-2-7
&
IND. CODE ANN.
§ 23-1.3-2-10
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“General public benefit”
means a material positive
impact on society and the
environment, taken as a
whole, assessed against a
third party standard, from
the business and operations
of a benefit corporation.
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(a) “Specific public
benefit” means a benefit
that serves:
(1) one (1) or more public
welfare, religious,
charitable, scientific,
literary, or educational
purposes; or
(2) other purposes or
benefits beyond the strict
interests of the
shareholders of the benefit
corporation.
(b) The term includes the
following:
(1) Providing low income
or underserved individuals
or communities with
beneficial products or
services.
(2) Promoting economic
opportunity for individuals
or communities beyond the
creation of jobs in the
normal course of business.
(3) Protecting or restoring
the environment.
(4) Improving human
health.
(5) Promoting the arts,
sciences, or advancement
of knowledge.
(6) Increasing the flow of
capital to entities with a
purpose to benefit society
or the environment.
(7) Conferring any other
particular benefit on
society or the environment.
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State and
Statutory
Reference

General Public Benefit
Definition

Specific Public Benefit
Definition

Louisiana

“General public benefit”
means a material positive
impact on society and the
environment, taken as a
whole, assessed against a
third-party standard, from
the business and operations
of a benefit corporation.

“Specific public benefit”
means any of the
following:
(a) Serving low-income or
underserved individuals or
communities.
(b) Promoting economic
opportunity for lowincome or underserved
individuals or
communities.
(c) Preserving the
environment, promoting
positive impacts on the
environment, or reducing
negative impacts on the
environment.
(d) Improving human
health.
(e) Promoting the arts,
sciences, or advancement
of knowledge.
(f) Increasing the flow of
capital to entities with a
purpose listed in this
Paragraph.
(g) Historic preservation.
(h) Urban beautification.

LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 12:1803
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State and
Statutory
Reference

General Public Benefit
Definition

Specific Public Benefit
Definition

Maryland

“General public benefit”
means a material, positive
impact on society and the
environment, as measured
by a third-party standard,
through activities that
promote a combination of
specific public benefits.

“Specific public benefit”
includes:
(1) Providing individuals
or communities with
beneficial products or
services;
(2) Promoting economic
opportunity for individuals
or communities beyond the
creation of jobs in the
normal course of business;
(3) Preserving the
environment;
(4) Improving human
health;
(5) Promoting the arts,
sciences, or advancement
of knowledge;
(6) Increasing the flow of
capital to entities with a
public benefit purpose; or
(7) The accomplishment of
any other particular benefit
for society or the
environment.

MD. CODE ANN.,
CORPS. & ASS'NS
§ 5-6C-01
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State and
Statutory
Reference

General Public Benefit
Definition

Specific Public Benefit
Definition

Massachusetts

“General public benefit”, a
material, positive impact
on society and the
environment, taken as a
whole, as measured by a
third-party standard, from
the business and operations
of a benefit corporation.

“Specific public benefit”,
any of the following:
(1) providing low-income
or underserved individuals
or communities with
beneficial products or
services;
(2) promoting economic
opportunity for individuals
or communities beyond the
creation of jobs in the
normal course of business;
(3) promoting the
preservation and
conservation of the
environment;
(4) improving human
health;
(5) promoting the arts,
sciences, access to and
advancement of
knowledge;
(6) increasing or
facilitating the flow of
capital and assets to
entities with a general
public benefit purpose; or
(7) conferring any other
particular benefit on
society or the environment.

MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. CH.
156E, § 2
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General Public Benefit
Definition

Specific Public Benefit
Definition

Minnesota

“General public benefit”
means a net material
positive impact from the
business and operations of
a general benefit
corporation on society, the
environment, and the wellbeing of present and future
generations.

“Specific public benefit”
means one or more positive
impacts, or reduction of a
negative impact, on
specified categories of
natural persons, entities,
communities, or interests,
other than shareholders in
their capacity as
shareholders, as
enumerated in the articles
of a public benefit
corporation.

MINN. STAT.
ANN. §
304A.021
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State and
Statutory
Reference

General Public Benefit
Definition

Specific Public Benefit
Definition

Montana

“General public benefit”
means a material, positive
impact on society and the
environment, taken as a
whole, as assessed against
a third-party standard, from
the business and operations
of a benefit corporation.

“Specific public benefit”
means:
(a) providing low-income
or underserved individuals
or communities with
beneficial products or
services;
(b) promoting economic
opportunity for individuals
or communities beyond the
creation of jobs in the
ordinary course of
business;
(c) preserving the
environment;
(d) improving human
health;
(e) promoting the arts,
sciences, or advancement
of knowledge;
(f) increasing the flow of
capital to entities with a
public benefit purpose; or
(g) the accomplishment of
any other particular benefit
for society or the
environment.

MONT. CODE
ANN. § 35-11402
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General Public Benefit
Definition

Specific Public Benefit
Definition

Nebraska

“General public benefit”
means a material positive
impact on society and the
environment, taken as a
whole, assessed against a
third-party standard, from
the business and operations
of a benefit corporation[.]

“Specific public benefit”
includes:
(a) Providing low-income
or underserved individuals
or communities with
beneficial products or
services;
(b) Promoting economic
opportunity for individuals
or communities beyond the
creation of jobs in the
normal course of business;
(c) Protecting or restoring
the environment;
(d) Improving human
health;
(e) Promoting the arts,
sciences, or advancement
of knowledge;
(f) Increasing the flow of
capital to entities with a
purpose to benefit society
or the environment; and
(g) Conferring any other
particular benefit on
society or the
environment[.]

NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 21-403
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State and
Statutory
Reference

General Public Benefit
Definition

Specific Public Benefit
Definition

Nevada

“General public benefit”
means a material positive
impact on society and the
environment, taken as a
whole, as assessed against
a third-party standard, from
the business and operations
of a benefit corporation.

“Specific public benefit”
includes, without
limitation:
1. Providing low-income or
underserved individuals or
communities with
beneficial products or
services;
2. Promoting economic
opportunity for individuals
or communities beyond the
creation of jobs in the
normal course of business;
3. Protecting, preserving or
restoring the environment;
4. Improving human
health;
5. Promoting the arts,
sciences or advancement of
knowledge;
6. Increasing the flow of
capital to entities with a
general public benefit
purpose; and
7. The accomplishment of
any other particular benefit
for society or the
environment.

NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 78B.040
&
NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 78B.060
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General Public Benefit
Definition

Specific Public Benefit
Definition

New Hampshire

“General public benefit”
means a material positive
effect on society and the
environment, taken as a
whole, assessed against a
third-party standard, from
the business and operations
of a benefit corporation.

“Specific public benefit”
includes:
(a) Providing low-income
or underserved individuals
or communities with
beneficial products or
services;
(b) Promoting economic
opportunity for individuals
or communities beyond the
creation of jobs in the
normal course of business;
(c) Protecting or restoring
the environment;
(d) Improving human
health;
(e) Promoting the arts,
sciences, or advancement
of knowledge;
(f) Increasing the flow of
capital to entities with a
purpose to benefit society
or the environment; and
(g) Conferring any other
particular benefit on
society or the environment.

N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 293-C:2
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State and
Statutory
Reference

General Public Benefit
Definition

Specific Public Benefit
Definition

New Jersey

“General public benefit”
means a material positive
impact on society and the
environment by the
operations of a benefit
corporation through
activities that promote
some combination of
specific public benefits.

“Specific public benefit”
includes:
(1) Providing low-income
individuals or communities
with beneficial products or
services;
(2) Promoting economic
opportunity for individuals
or communities beyond the
creation of jobs in the
normal course of business;
(3) Preserving the
environment;
(4) Improving human
health;
(5) Promoting the arts,
sciences or advancement of
knowledge;
(6) Increasing the flow of
capital to entities with a
public benefit purpose; and
(7) The accomplishment of
any other particular benefit
for society or the
environment.

N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A:18-1
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General Public Benefit
Definition

Specific Public Benefit
Definition

New York

“General public benefit”
means a material positive
impact on society and the
environment, taken as a
whole, assessed against a
third-party standard, from
the business and operations
of a benefit corporation.

“Specific public benefit,”
includes:
(1) providing low-income
or underserved individuals
or communities with
beneficial products or
services;
(2) promoting economic
opportunity for individuals
or communities beyond the
creation of jobs in the
normal course of business;
(3) preserving the
environment;
(4) improving human
health;
(5) promoting the arts,
sciences or advancement of
knowledge;
(6) increasing the flow of
capital to entities with a
public benefit purpose; and
(7) the accomplishment of
any other particular benefit
for society or the
environment.

N.Y. BUS. CORP.
LAW § 1702
(McKinney)

Oregon
OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 60.750

“General public benefit”
means a material positive
impact on society and the
environment, taken as a
whole, from the business
and operations of a benefit
company.

2017]
Pennsylvania
15 PA. STAT.
AND CONS.

STAT. ANN. §
3302
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“General public benefit.” A
material positive impact on
society and the
environment, taken as a
whole and assessed against
a third-party standard, from
the business and operations
of a benefit corporation.
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“Specific public benefit.”
Includes:
(1) providing low-income
or underserved individuals
or communities with
beneficial products or
services;
(2) promoting economic
opportunity for individuals
or communities beyond the
creation of jobs in the
normal course of business;
(3) preserving the
environment;
(4) improving human
health;
(5) promoting the arts,
sciences or advancement of
knowledge;
(6) promoting economic
development through
support of initiatives that
increase access to capital
for emerging and growing
technology enterprises,
facilitate the transfer and
commercial adoption of
new technologies, provide
technical and business
support to emerging and
growing technology
enterprises or form support
partnerships that support
those objectives;
(7) increasing the flow of
capital to entities with a
public benefit purpose; and
(8) the accomplishment of
any other particular benefit
for society or the
environment.
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Statutory
Reference

General Public Benefit
Definition

Specific Public Benefit
Definition

Rhode Island

“General public benefit”
means a material positive
impact on society and the
environment, taken as a
whole, assessed against a
third-party standard, from
the business and operations
of a benefit corporation.

“Specific public benefit”
includes:
(i) Providing low-income
or underserved individuals
or communities with
beneficial products or
services;
(ii) Promoting economic
opportunity for individuals
or communities beyond the
creation of jobs in the
normal course of business;
(iii) Protecting or restoring
the environment;
(iv) Improving human
health;
(v) Promoting the arts,
sciences, or advancement
of knowledge;
(vi) Increasing the flow of
capital to entities with a
purpose to benefit society
or the environment; and
(vii) Conferring any other
particular benefit on
society or the environment.

7 R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 75.3-2
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State and
Statutory
Reference

General Public Benefit
Definition

Specific Public Benefit
Definition

South Carolina

“General public benefit”
means a material positive
impact on society and the
environment taken as a
whole, as assessed against
a third-party standard, from
the business and operations
of a benefit corporation.

“Specific public benefit
purpose” means a benefit
that serves one or more
public welfare, religious,
charitable, scientific,
literary, or educational
purposes, or other purposes
or benefits beyond the
strict interest of the
shareholders of the benefit
corporation, including:
(a) providing low-income
or underserved individuals,
families, or communities
with beneficial products,
services, or educational
opportunities;
(b) promoting economic
opportunity for individuals
or communities beyond the
creation of jobs in the
normal course of business;
(c) preserving or
improving the
environment;
(d) improving human
health;
(e) promoting the arts,
sciences, or advancement
of knowledge;
(f) increasing the flow of
capital to entities with a
public benefit purpose; or
(g) conferring any other
particular benefit on
society and the
environment.

S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 33-38-130
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General Public Benefit
Definition

Tennessee

“Public benefit” means a
positive effect or reduction
of negative effects on one
(1) or more categories of
persons, entities,
communities, or interests,
other than shareholders in
their capacities as
shareholders, including,
but not limited to, an
artistic, charitable, cultural,
economic, educational,
environmental, literary,
medical, religious,
scientific, or technological
effect[.]

TENN. CODE
ANN. § 48-28103
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Specific Public Benefit
Definition
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State and
Statutory
Reference

General Public Benefit
Definition

Specific Public Benefit
Definition

Utah

“General public benefit”
means a material positive
impact on society and the
environment:
(a) taken as a whole;
(b) assessed against a thirdparty standard; and
(c) from the business of a
benefit corporation.

“Specific public benefit”
includes:
(a) providing low-income
or underserved individuals
or communities with
beneficial products or
services;
(b) promoting economic
opportunity for individuals
or communities beyond the
creation of jobs in the
normal course of business;
(c) protecting or restoring
the environment;
(d) improving human
health;
(e) promoting the arts,
sciences, or advancement
of knowledge;
(f) increasing the flow of
capital to entities with a
purpose to benefit society
or the environment; and
(g) conferring any other
particular benefit on
society or the environment.

UTAH CODE
ANN. § 16-10b103
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General Public Benefit
Definition

Specific Public Benefit
Definition

Vermont

“General public benefit”
means a material positive
impact on society and the
environment, as measured
by a third-party standard,
through activities that
promote some combination
of specific public benefits.

“Specific public benefit”
includes:
(A) providing low income
or underserved individuals
or communities with
beneficial products or
services;
(B) promoting economic
opportunity for individuals
or communities beyond the
creation of jobs in the
normal course of business;
(C) preserving or
improving the
environment;
(D) improving human
health;
(E) promoting the arts or
sciences or the
advancement of
knowledge;
(F) increasing the flow of
capital to entities with a
public benefit purpose; and
(G) the accomplishment of
any other identifiable
benefit for society or the
environment.

VT. STAT. ANN.
TIT. 11A, § 21.03
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State and
Statutory
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General Public Benefit
Definition

Specific Public Benefit
Definition

Virginia

“General public benefit”
means a material positive
impact on society and the
environment taken as a
whole, as measured by a
third-party standard, from
the business and operations
of a benefit corporation.

“Specific public benefit”
means a benefit that serves
one or more public
welfare, religious,
charitable, scientific,
literary, or educational
purposes, or other purpose
or benefit beyond the strict
interest of the shareholders
of the benefit corporation,
including:
1. Providing low-income or
underserved individuals or
communities with
beneficial products or
services;
2. Promoting economic
opportunity for individuals
or communities beyond the
creation of jobs in the
normal course of business;
3. Preserving or improving
the environment;
4. Improving human
health;
5. Promoting the arts,
sciences, or advancement
of knowledge;
6. Increasing the flow of
capital to entities with a
public benefit purpose; and
7. Conferring any other
particular benefit on
society or the environment.

VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-782
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Statutory
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General Public Benefit
Definition

Specific Public Benefit
Definition

West Virginia

“General public benefit”
means a material positive
impact on society and the
environment taken as a
whole, as measured by a
third-party standard, from
the business and operations
of a benefit corporation.

“Specific public benefit”
means a benefit that serves
one or more public
welfare, religious,
charitable, scientific,
literary or educational
purposes, or other purpose
or benefit beyond the strict
interest of the shareholders
of the benefit corporation,
including:
(1) Providing low-income
or underserved individuals
or communities with
beneficial products or
services;
(2) Promoting economic
opportunity for individuals
or communities beyond the
creation of jobs in the
normal course of business;
(3) Preserving or
improving the
environment;
(4) Improving human
health;
(5) Promoting the arts,
sciences or advancement of
knowledge;
(6) Increasing the flow of
capital to entities with a
public benefit purpose; and
(7) Conferring any other
particular benefit on
society or the environment.

W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 31F-1102
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General Public Benefit
Definition

Specific Public Benefit
Definition

Washington,
D.C.

“General public benefit”
means the material positive
impact that the business
and operations of a benefit
corporation has on society
and the environment, taken
as a whole, assessed
against a third-party
standard.

“Specific public benefit”
includes:
(A) Providing low-income
or underserved individuals
or communities with
beneficial products or
services;
(B) Promoting economic
opportunity for individuals
or communities beyond the
creation of jobs in the
normal course of business;
(C) Preserving the
environment;
(D) Improving human
health;
(E) Promoting the arts,
sciences, or advancement
of knowledge;
(F) Increasing the flow of
capital to entities with a
public benefit purpose; and
(G) The accomplishment
of any other particular
benefit on society or the
environment.

D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 29-1301.02
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APPENDIX 3: SUMMARY OF BENEFIT CORPORATION DIRECTOR AND
OFFICER PROVISIONS IN STATE BENEFIT CORPORATION STATUTES
(CURRENT AS OF MARCH 2016)
State

Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Louisiana
Maryland
Massachusetts

Director
Required

Director
Optional

X

No Benefit
Director/
Officer
Statute

X
X
X
X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X

Minnesota
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Tennessee

Depends on Officer
Public
Optional
Company
Status

X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
Xa

X
X

X

Utah
Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia
Washington D.C.
X
a optional for close corporations

X

X
X
X

